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I. INTRODUCTION
ON JULY 17, 2014, MALAYSIA AIRLINES FLIGHT MH17
took off from Amsterdam, en route to Kuala Lumpur, on
what should have been an uneventful flight.' The 298 passen-
I Robert Wall, Final Report on Downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH1 7 Due Octo-
ber, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2015, 7:38 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/final-re
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gers and 15 crew on board included 193 Dutch, 43 Malaysian
and 27 Australian nationals.2
The flight traversed airspace in the Netherlands, Germany,
Poland, and the Ukraine.' After Flight MH17 made contact with
air traffic control in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine (Dnipro Control),
Dnipro Control requested clearance from Russian Air Control
in Rostov-on-Don (RND). Dnipro Control requested that Air
Traffic Control (ATC) move over to Russian Air Control.4 Rus-
sian Air Control granted its request.5 Dnipro Control then tried
reaching Flight MH17 to advise the pilots.6 After a further com-
munication with RND to see if the flight was appearing on their
radar, the flight had vanished.7 Flight MH17 crashed near the
town of Hrabove in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast province
approximately forty kilometers (twenty-five miles) from the Rus-
sian border.8
The aircraft was "flying in unrestricted airspace, under con-
trol of ATC, flying at an altitude cleared by ATC."9 It was at an
altitude of 1,000 feet above the upper limit of a restricted air-
space."0 The Donbass People's Militia, pro-Russian separatists,
held an insurgency on the Ukraine territory where the wreckage
fell.1" Insurgents controlled the crash site where armed conflict
port-on-downing-of-malaysia-airlines-flight-mh 17-due-october-1440675525 [http:/
/perma.cc/GJ26-LSFC].
2 MH17 Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know, BBC (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-28357880 [http://perma.cc/753K-MZVL].
3 Id.
4 Leonid Bershidsky, Night MH17 Crash Report Answers One Question, BLOOM-






8 Ukraine: Pro-Russia Rebels Downed Malaysian Plane, DAILY MAIL (July 17, 2014,
9:57 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/arficle-2696170/Ukraine-Pro-
Russia-rebels-downed-Malaysian-plane.html [http://perma.cc/K5T9-ZC6H].
9 DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, PRELIMINARY REPORT: CRASH INVOLVING MALAYSIA AIR-
LINES BOEING 777-200 FLIGHT MH17 (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.onderzoeksra
ad.nl/en/onderzoek/2049/investigation-crash-mh 17-17july-2014/preliminary-re
port/ 1562/preliminary-report-points-towards-external-cause-of-mh 1 7-crash [http:
//perma.cc/B9Z4-UYHJ] [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].
10 Id. at 13.
11 Malaysian Airlines MH1 7 Reported Crashed Just After Rebel Leader Boasted of Shoot-
ing Down Plane: "We Warned Them Not to Fly in Our Skies", NAT'L POST (July 14,
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was active. 12 The insurgents and the insurgency severely ham-
pered the Dutch Safety Board's initial attempts to recover wreck-
age from the crash site.13 The Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib
Razak, and the Malaysian Transport Minister, Liow Tiong Lai,
carefully negotiated with the insurgents to ship the bodies of
deceased passengers to the Netherlands and hand over of the
flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder. 4
II. LEGAL ISSUES EXAMINED
This article will explore the following issues to analyze and
determine legal responsibility and liability for the tragic chain of
events leading to the destruction of Malaysia Airlines, Flight
MH17. Part III will examine issues of individual criminal liabil-
ity, to the extent the facts are known, and apply the law of
armed conflict to assess whether it is an internal armed conflict
or an internationalized conflict, and the potential criminal lia-
bility in either case.1 5 This article then considers the probable
role of the relevant actors relative to their status as subordinates,
superiors, or commanders and discusses the mens rea proof re-
quirements in order to conclude that an international criminal
investigation is merited.16
Part IV considers an aviation-specific perspective on the Flight
MH17 incident, beginning with the potential liability for per-
ceived failures in ATC services. This includes an examination of
the role of the Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise
(UkSATSE), and Eurocontrol, in addition to the leadership role
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 1 This
article compares the systemic response of these bodies to the
12 Id.
13 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Crashed, AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BUREAU,
http://www.aaib.gov.mn/newspage/view/544 [http://perma.cc/T8Y4-77KN]
(last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
14 Lindsay Murdoch, MH-1 7: Secret Calls Led to Breakthrough Agreement on Bodies,
BlackBoxes, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 22, 2014, 10:34 AM), http://www.smh.
com.au/world/mh 17-secret-calls-led-to-breakthrough-agreement-on-bodies-black
boxes-20140722-zvikv.html [http://perma.cc/A6HC-RV3V]; see also Brian Ries,
MHI 7 Black Box Intact, Data Successfully Downloaded, MASHABLE (July 23, 2014),
http://mashable.com/2014/07/23/mh17-cockpit-voice-recorder-black-box/#5ik
2sS.cgOqs [http://perma.cc/8RMH-ZDFF].
15 Theodor Meron et al., Application of Humanitarian Law in Noninternational
Armed Conflicts, 85 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 83, 83 (1991).
16 William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1015 (2003).
17 John Croft, MH1 7 Flight Route Approved By Eurocontrol, Safe Per ICAO, IA TA,
AVIATION WV. (July 18, 2014), http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/
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Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) decisive treatment of
the same developing situation in the Ukraine."8 This article flags
the key conclusions of the Interim Accident Report prepared by
the Dutch Safety Board before considering prior incidents of
attacks on civilian aircraft, the development of State practice in
making compensatory payments, and the the 1944 Convention
on International Civil Aviation's (Chicago Convention) prohibi-
tion on such interference.1" Finally, this article considers the le-
gal options available to the relatives of deceased passengers on
Flight MH17.
Part III argues in favor of eradicating impunity for the crimes
involved in the downing of Flight MH17. It asserts there is prob-
able cause to conduct a thorough international criminal investi-
gation into war crimes and calls on the Ukraine to temporally
extend its self-referral to the International Criminal Court to in-
clude these crimes.
Part IV argues for greater international communication re-
garding the control of airspace above insurgencies to prevent
this tragic event from ever occurring again. The authors concur
with the views expressed by the International Air Transport As-
sociation (IATA) in calling for a fail-safe system of airspace clo-
sure. On passenger liability issues, the authors strongly favor the
responsible State making monetary payments to the relatives of
passengers consonant with those made by the United States in
the wake of the USS Vincennes incident.
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. THE INSURGENTS
The separatist conflict began in February 2014 when "Russia-
friendly Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted by
protesters. ' 20 That following April, separatist militia groups
mh 17-flight-route-approved-eurocontrol-safe-icao-iata [http://perma.cc/8LTD-
GSV8].
18 Binoy Kampmark, MHIl7 and Ukraine's Dilemma, COUNTER PUNCH (July 18,
2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/07/18/mh17-and-
ukraines-dilemma/print/ [http://perma.cc/86CH-YZ92].
19 Robert Wall, Dutch Safety Board Says Investigators Examine Possible Buk Anti-
Aircraft Missile Parts, IPR NEws WiRE (Aug. 11, 2015), http://iprnewswire.com/
dutch-safety-board-says-investigators-examine-possible-buk-anti-aircraft-missile-
parts/ [http://perma.cc/3H9G-YVHE].
20 Michael Birnbaum, Ukraine Pro-Russia Rebels Hold Elections in the East, Fueling
Conflict, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2014), http://wpo.st/Ou5j0 [http://perma.cc/2Y
NJ-TSSC].
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seized control of government buildings in Donetsk, Kharkiv and
Sloviansk.2 1 In response, Russia annexed the Ukraine's Crimean
peninsula, and separatist protesters seized eastern Ukrainian
government buildings and territory.22 The subsequent fighting
between insurgents and Ukrainian forces resulted in the deaths
of over 4,000 people.2 3 After the downing of Flight MH17, the
armies of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk Peo-
ple's Republic merged to form the "United Army of Novoros-
siya. '24 While the insurgents currently control the territory
where Flight MH17 debris scattered, it is doubtful that their
newly created State could claim sovereignty over this territory.25
The traditional criteria of statehood, under international law,
requires a (a) permanent population; (b) defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other
States (Montevideo Criteria) .26 Various international organiza-
tions apply this criteria when establishing if an entity is a state,
such as by the Badinter Arbitration Committee. 27 The Monte-
video Criteria are not separate elements of a test to be proven
independently of each other; each criteria is designed to realize
the core principle of effectiveness, i.e. the essence of a state is a
government exercising control over a territory and a population
and having the independent capacity to enter into relations with
other states. 28 State practice suggests that the Montevideo Crite-
21 Ukraine Crisis: What Is Happening Where?, BBC (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-27012612 [http://perma.cc/M85X-6WK4].
22 Kathy Lally, Putin's Remarks Raise Fears of Future Moves Against Ukraine, WASH.
POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://wpo.st/516j0 [http://perma.cc/PCX4-AAUD].




24 Linda Kinstler, Putin Just Got Exactly What He Wanted in Eastern Ukraine, NEW
REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/Article/119460/east
ern-ukraine-ceasefire-exactly-what-putin-wanted [http://perma.cc/E42Q-3EC8].
25 See Dutch Say Their Mission to Recover Remains of Downed MH-1 7 Airliner in East
Ukraine is Complete, UKR. TODAY (May 2, 2015), http://uatoday.tv/geopolitics/
dutch-say-their-mission-to-recover-remains-of-downed-mh 17-airliner-in-east-
ukraine-is-complete-424966.html [http://perma.cc/K6K9-46QQ].
26 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
27 Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee-A Second Breath
for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUROPEAN J. OF INT'L LAW [E.J.I.L.] 179,
182-83 (1992).
28 JAMES CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2d ed.
2006); Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Dis-
contents, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 410 (1998-1999); Shaina Stahl, Unpro-
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ria are not exhaustive, immutable, or conclusive factors of state-
hood.29 In fact, Crawford suggested that the Montevideo
Criteria are "no more than a basis for further investigation."" °
However, they do reflect a core principle of internationally ef-
fective polity: that a state exists where there is the effective estab-
lishment of an organized political community on a territory.3"
The requirement of an effective government in control of terri-
tory and population has also been upheld in the discussion on
applications for United Nations (UN) membership made by
South Korea, the Republic of Vietnam, Ceylon, Mongolia, and
Indonesia.3 2
While the insurgents have declared a State to be in existence,
it is contentious to assert they have a viable administration. 33
Equally, apart from the Russian Federation, it is questionable
that the insurgents have the capacity to enter into viable diplo-
matic relations. 4 James Crawford notes that the "[c]apacity to
enter into relations with States at the international level is no
longer, if it ever was, an exclusive State prerogative," and cites
Community Competence to Conclude Certain International Agreements
in support of this view.3 5 Nevertheless, it also seems that the
Donetsk People's Republic (now United Armed Forces of
Novorossiya) belligerent occupation of the area does not affect
the continuity of the original State (the Ukraine) in respect of
its territory before the insurgency.36 Even where governmental
authorities may be "driven into exile or silenced," the powers of
tected Ground: The Plight of Vanishing Island Nations, 23 N.Y. INT'L L. Rv. 1, 17
(2010).
29 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (7th ed. 2008).
30 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 128
(8th ed. 2012).
31 ROBERT JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY: IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1(1963); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and AnalyticalJurisprudence, 55 HART.
L. REV. 44, 64-65 (1941-42).
32 Rosalyn Cohen, The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 1127, 1135-42 (1961).
33 See Karina Oganesyan, Donestsk, Luhansk: The "People's Republics"One Year On,
DEUTSCHE WELL (May 11, 2015), http://dw.com/p/lFOFY [http://perma.cc/
E94U-4KEW]. Acceptance of the pro-Russian separatists seems to have been
greater one year after the referendum, if not solidified.
34 CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 28, at 417.
35 Id. at 61 (citing Opinion 1/94, Community Competence to Conclude Cer-
tain International Agreements, 1994 E.C.R 1-5276).
36 See Paul Sonne, With "Novorossiya, " Putin Plays the Name Game With Ukraine,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/Articles/with-novorossiya-putin-
plays-the-name-game-with-ukraine-1409588947 [http://perma.cc/HX96-NFWH].
A literal translation of "Novorossiya" is "New Russia." Id.
2015] 645
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the existing State continue.37 Further, Crawford notes that
"there is a presumption that an entity with the formal attributes
of a State, which is established by a belligerent occupant, is not
independent, and hence, not a State under international law." 38
In this context, the gaze of the international community is fixed
on the issues associated with Russian Federation involvement
and support for the separatist forces.39
B. THE PUPPET POLLS
On November 2, 2014, the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the
two regions currently controlled by the insurgents, held simulta-
neous elections where "anyone could vote at any polling place
he or she wanted, as well as online."40 However, the people who
were running the polls did not have access to any voter registra-
tion data, which would seem to be a minimum requirement for
those engaging in such an enterprise.4 1
The effectiveness of the polls as a unilateral step of succession
is doubtful. There is a strong international reluctance to sup-
port unilateral secession or separation, and there is no recogni-
tion of a unilateral right to secede based merely on a majority
vote of the population of a given territory.42 Interestingly, the
Crimean referendum of March 16, 2014, was not recognized by
numerous States on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated
Ukraine's constitution, was hastily conducted, and was con-
ducted while Russia controlled Crimea's land, sea, and air ac-
cess. 43 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution
68/262 further affirmed this position.44
C. ALLEGED RussiAN INVOLVEMENT
Immediately after the Flight MH17 crash, the United States
suggested that it had evidence that the jet was shot down by a
37 CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 28, at 73.
38 Id. at 156; see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 78 (June 21).
39 Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia's Crimea Takeover Plot, BBC (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226 [http://perma.cc/7HDF-
MC6U].
- Birnbaum, supra note 20.
41 Id.
42 CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES, supra note 28, at 417.
43 G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014); U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7144th mtg. at
6-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7144 (Mar. 19, 2014).
- G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 43, at 2.
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Russian Buk missile provided by Russia to the separatist forces.45
The United States also alleged that the rocket launcher involved
in the crash was rapidly withdrawn to Russia.46 Russian involve-
ment is the subject of conjecture. Olexsandr Zakharchenko, a
separatist, and the Prime Minister of the Donetsk People's Re-
public (Novorossiya), has openly admitted that "[t]here have
been some 3,000-4,000" Russian volunteers fighting with the
insurgents.4 7
Additionally, Zakharchenko conceded that many of these in-
dividuals come from the Russian military.48  He stated,
"[m]oreover, I'll be even more sincere to tell you that some ac-
tive military servicemen are fighting among us too, who have
preferred to spend their vacation not on a beach but among us,
their brothers fighting for our freedom. ' 49 While the Russian
Federation has denied its active military involvement in the in-
surgency, evidence to the contrary has been mounting.5" In fact,
in August 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
released satellite images "which it says show Russian combat
forces, armed with heavy weapons, engaged in military opera-
tions in Ukraine."'" NATO claimed that over 1,000 Russian
troops were operating in Ukraine with around 20,000 troops sta-
tioned near the border.52
45 Dominic Rushe, MH1 7: Kerry Says All Evidence Points to Separatists and Urges
Russia to "Step Up", GUARDIAN (July 21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jul/20/mhl 7-kerry-evidence-ukrainian-separatists [http://perma.cc
/3CAR-9MKX] ; MH1 7: Missile System Came From Russia: Kerry, NEW STRAITS TIMES
ONLINE (July 20, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.nst.com.my/node/15448 [http://
perma.cc/PCZ5-A6HU].
46 Rushe, supra note 45.
47 All Russians Fighting for Donbas Militia Are Volunteers-Self-Proclaimed Donetsk
Peoples' Republic PM, RussiA BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:30 AM),
http://rbth.com/news/2014/08/28/all-russians-fightingjordonbas-militia_
arevolunteers--_self-proclaime_39357.html [http://perma.cc/8BSY4FQ7]; see
Donetsk Militants Say They "Will Have Army of 100,000 Men", UNIAN (Feb. 2, 2015,
3:40 PM), http://www.unian.info/war/1039283-donetsk-militants-say-they-will-
have-army-of-100000.html [http://perma.cc/JQ5Z-A25V].
48 All Russians Fighting for Donbas Militia Are Volunteers-Self-Proclaimed Donetsk
Peoples' Republic PM, supra note 47.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Ukraine Crisis: NA TO Releases Satellite Images Which It Says Show Russian Troops
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D. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The assessment of criminal liability, including command re-
sponsibility, of the actors in the Flight MH17 crash must turn
upon the findings of a rigorous criminal investigation. Criminal
law is highly fact-specific, yet the facts surrounding this crash are
in dispute. Credible evidence is essential. Although the Dutch
Safety Board has issued a preliminary report, this report did not
assess whether criminal activity was present.53 Moreover, the
Dutch authorities face the hurdles of conducting their investiga-
tion in the fog of war.54 In a rigorous criminal investigation, the
issues that determine liability would also include whether this
was an international armed conflict (JAC) or an internal or non-
international armed conflict (NIAC); whether the relative actors
are liable horizontally or vertically; and the mens rea standard
for subordinates, superiors, and commanders.55
The final crash report has confirmed that the aircraft was
downed by an external, high energy source. 56 The Russian Fed-
eration contended early on that the source of the explosion was
the Ukrainian military forces.57 Other facts that have surfaced
tend to inculpate the separatist forces that, according to U.S.
officials, fired a Buk missile. 51 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
observed that imagery collected by U.S. intelligence agencies
showed that a missile was launched from eastern Ukraine and
was bound to strike the Malaysian civil aircraft. 59 The launcher
53 Toby Sterling, Dutch Safety Board Set to Say MH1 7 Downed by Russian-Made




55 Jens David Ohlin, Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Hori-
zontal Modes of Liability, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 771, 771 (2012).
56 DUTCH SAFETv BOARD, MH17 CRASH 19-20 (Oct. 2015), http://
www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/debcd724fe7breport-mh 17-
crash.pdf [hereinafter MH17 CRASH REPORT].
57 Tom Parfitt, Russia Says MH-17 Was Shot Down by Plane Missiles, TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine
/ 11232683/Russia-says-MH-17-was-shot-down-by-plane-missiles.h tml [http://
perma.cc/BQR4-YAWC].
58 Brian Bennett, U.S. Officials Believe Attack Against Malaysian Plane Was Mis-
take, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-
ukraine-intelligence-us-20140722-story.html [http://perma.cc/66WM-AM5M].
59 Philip Bump, Kerry: Ukraine Crash is "A Moment of Truth"for Russia, WASH.
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design for these anti-aircraft weapons "used a rudimentary radar
system that gives an incomplete picture of what is flying above,
officials said. '60 These systems are designed to link with other
radar that could enhance the targeting system and would allow
distinction between military and civilian aircraft.61 The separat-
ists, however, did not have those secondary radar images availa-
ble and may have mistaken the Malaysian airliner for a
Ukrainian military plane.6 2 This view is bolstered by the conten-
tion that the separatist forces had recently shot down a Ukrain-
ian AN-26 military transport plane in the same vicinity.63 Shortly
after Flight MH17 went down, a Russian social networking page
published a post asserting that rebels had shot down a plane
outside Torez, near the location of the wreckage of Flight
MH17.64 The post, which was later deleted, appeared to incor-
rectly identify the aircraft as an AN-26 military transport plane,
lending credence to the theory that the rebels mistakenly
downed the Malaysian airliner.6 5
Moreover, one senior United States official opined that an
"ill-trained crew" may have fired the missile and noted that, "it
does appear to be a mistake. '66 It was emphasized in the prelimi-
nary report that the aircraft was flying approximately 1,000 feet
above the no-fly zone, open to commercial air traffic, and that
there were four other commercial jets flying in the same area at
the same time.67
Though the Russian Federation has denied supplying the sep-
aratists with Buk missiles, 6 Kerry, citing an "enormous amount
of evidence," accused Russia of providing Buk missiles and req-
60 Bennett, supra note 58.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See Alec Luhn, Three Pro-Russia Rebel Leaders at the Centre of Suspicions Over





66 Bennett, supra note 58.
67 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9, at 14.
68 Mark Trevelyan, Ukraine Says Rebels Strengthened by Tanks, Missiles from Russia,
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uisite training to pro-Russian rebels.69 Moreover, American in-
telligence analysts had confirmed the authenticity of recorded
conversations between rebel leaders about the shooting down of
what they thought was a Ukrainian military transport plane
shortly after Flight MH17 lost contact. 70 Other evidence in-
cludes the existence of a Russian military installation near the
city of Rostov, which serves as a source of Russian support to
separatists and has been described as "a hub of training and
weapons that has expanded dramatically over the past month"
prior to the downing of Flight MH17. 7 1 Additionally, the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine reported that Russia was moving heavy
weaponry into eastern Ukraine.72
Though admittedly conflicted, Ukrainian officials and news
sites have produced evidence alleging that at least one Buk was
present in a town near the crash site.73 Given the sophistication
of the weaponry and the training needed to bring down a plane
at the height at which Flight MH17 was flying, Kerry asserted
that, it is "pretty clear that this is a system that was transferred
from Russia in the hands of separatists. '74
Germany's foreign intelligence service have also concluded
that pro-Russian rebels were responsible for the crash.75 Yet,
69 Interview with Bob Schieffer of CBS's Face the Nation, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July
20, 2014), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229509.htm [http:
//perma.cc/7D2G-L62M].
70 United States Assessment of the Downing of Flight MH-1 7 and its Aftermath, EM-
BASSY OF THE U.S. AT KvIV, UKR. (2014), http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/state
ments/asmt-07192014.html [http://perma.cc/9V6P-BMEH].
71 Greg Miller, U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, WASH. POST
(July 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-dis
closes-intelligence-on-downing-of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/22/bl78fe58-1 lel-1 le
4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html [http://perma.cc/2TCD-HC4V].
72 United States Assessment of the Downing of Flight MR-1 7 and its Aftermath, supra
note 70 (the weaponry delivered included "150 vehicles including tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, and multiple rocket launchers").
73 James Nye et al., Tucked in the Corner of a Leafy Square, is this the Russian Missile




74 Interview with Candy Crowley of CNN's State of the Union, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(July 20, 2014), http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229508.htm
[http://perma.cc/LJL5-84D5].
75 Hubert Gude & Fidelius Schmid, Deadly Ukraine Crash: German Intelligence
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they claim to have intelligence indicating that the rebels cap-
tured a Buk missile system from a Ukrainian military base,
7 6
which if true, may tend to exculpate Russian involvement. If the
rocket, supplied by the Russian Federation, was fired by separat-
ists under the mistaken belief that Flight MH17 was a Ukrainian
military plane, then war crimes may nonetheless have been com-
mitted and command responsibility may be applicable. If the
Buk missile were captured from Ukrainian forces, individual
criminal liability would be less likely. In the case of the former,
criminal responsibility may rest with the individual soldiers fir-
ing the missiles, the commanders who exercised effective con-
trol over the soldiers, and/or the civilian leadership in the
Russian Federation.
Drawing upon the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Optional
Protocol II of 1977, the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court (RS) specifies in Article 8(2) (b) (i) that it is a serious
violation of war crimes to "intentionally direct[ ] attacks against
the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not
taking part in hostilities '' 77 in an JAC. Alternatively, RS Article
8(2) (e) (i) provides the same definition for NIAC.78
E. INTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT?
While the RS and customary international law provide penal-
ties for intentionally directing attacks against civilians in both
NIAC and IAC, NIACs may attract criminal liability even when
those attacks were under orders, or when the attack against civil-
ians was the product of mistake.79 Thus, defenses and liability
are conditioned upon the status of the conflict; if the conflict is
an NIAC, then domestic or vertical liability (e.g., extradition)
76 Id.
77 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2) (b) (i), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter RS].
78 Id. art. 8(2) (e) (i) (the court shall have jurisdiction over "[o]ther serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an interna-
tional character, within the established framework of international law . . [in-
cluding inter alia] (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities").
79 Id. art. 32-33; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War art. 109, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.W.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention] (a POW status can only be gained in an international armed con-
flict, where they must be repatriated once hostilities have ceased in accordance
with Article 109 of the Third Geneva Convention).
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may vest.8 0 If the conflict is an JAC, then the perpetrators (i.e.,
soldiers firing the Buk missile under orders) may avail them-
selves to defenses and potentially avoid criminal liability at the
cessation of hostilities. Although, command liability may none-
theless attract prosecution as a war crime. 81 The Russian Federa-
tion has maintained that this is an NIAC, though this claim is
hotly contested.82
1. Immunity in International Armed Conflicts
It is established law that the benefit of combatant status car-
ries immunity. "Upon capture, combatants entitled to prisoner-
of-war (POW) status may neither be tried for their participation
in the hostilities nor for acts that do not violate international
humanitarian law. This is a long-standing rule of customary in-
ternational law."'83 Moreover, "[t] his privilege ... [is] universally
recognized.184 POWs cannot be tried in domestic courts during
an JAC unless their "actions (1) rise to the level of a 'war crime'
or 'crime against humanity'; or (2) are unrelated to the state of
hostilities (i.e., are common crimes) 85 and must be repatriated
once hostilities have ceased in accordance with Article 109 of
the Third Geneva Convention.8 6
This rule is unique to combatants in an LAC since the attempt
to introduce the concept of POWs into NIACs has failed. 7 Thus,
non-state armed groups, which do not fall within the definition
of a POW in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, or those
80 RS, supra note 77, art. 17.
81 Id. art. 33.
82 See Sarah Rainsford, Nadiya Savchenko: Ukraine Resistance Symbol in Russia,
BBC (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31760381 [http:/
/perma.cc/6T6X-NHNF] (noting the fact that the Ukrainian pilot, Nadiya
Savchenko, was arrested by Russia and charged as an accessory to murder of two
Russian journalists via mortar fire is consistent with Russia's claim that the armed
conflict remains internal).
83 CUSTOMARY INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 384 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
84 Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 367,
376 n.38 (2004).
85 Id. at 436-37; see also Third Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 85.
86 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 109 ("Subject to the provisions
of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send
back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and
seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to
travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.").
87 SANDESH SivAKuMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
513 (2012).
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in NIACs could be tried in accordance with the domestic legal
system often "as criminals or traitors, and, increasingly,
terrorists."8
2. The Line Between Non-International Armed Conflicts and
International Armed Conflicts
An NIAC is defined in Article 1 (1) of Optional Protocol II as,
"dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations. '8 9 This definition aptly fits the ac-
tions of the Ukrainian separatists as they hold territory against
the government forces and are able to carry out sustained mili-
tary operations.90 This would bring the conflict under the RS
Article 8 (2) (c) (d) (e), the Optional Protocol II and common
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention.9 It would also pro-
vide for domestic criminal sanctions for all rebel forces and po-
tential extradition, whether war crimes have been committed or
not.9 2 However, an NIAC possessing sufficient international ele-
ments could be internationalized and would consequently be
governed by the law of IAC. 93 This may occur in three situations,
(1) where a state recognizes the situation as one of belligerency;
(2) where the armed conflict is a war of national liberation; or
(3) where an outside state intervenes in the conflict.94 Most ap-
ropos to the instant case is the third scenario. An outside state
may intervene in two ways: by militarily assisting in the hostilities
on the side of the armed group or by exerting control over the
non-state armed group.9
a. The "Assisting in the Hostilities" Limb
There are two considerations in this form of intervention.
One utilizes the theory of pairing, which holds that the side
88 Id. at 514.
89 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col II) art. 1(1)-(2), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
90 Malaysian Airlines MHI 7 Reported Crashed, supra note 11.
91 RS, supra note 77, art. 8(2)(c); Protocol II, supra note 89, art. 1 (1)-(2); Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 79, art. 3(1).
92 See SrVAKUMARAN, supra note 87, at 514.
93 Id. at 212.
94 Id.
95 DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 582
(2013).
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whom the outside state chooses to assist, the government or the
armed group, would be determinative of the nature of the
armed conflict. 96 The other approach holds that the armed con-
flict would nevertheless become international in character,
whichever side the outside state assists.97
For the first approach, if the outside state intervenes on the
side of the government forces, the action would not be trans-
formed into an IAC.98 The rationale is that the fighting would
remain between a state and a non-state armed group instead of
between states.99 This approach was applied by the ICJ in Nicara-
gua v. United States, where the court noted:
The conflict between the contras' forces and those of the Gov-
ernment of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is "not of an
international character[."] The acts of the contras towards the
Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law appli-
cable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the
United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules
relating to international conflicts.1"'
In Nicaragua, since the "minimum rules applicable" are identi-
cal in both IACs and NIACs, the court commented that it was
unnecessary to make such a categorization.101 This was similarly
held in Prosecutor v. Tadic.10 2
The second approach holds that outside intervention on ei-
ther side would internationalize the conflict.103 Certain Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
cases have gone further to suggest that involvement of outside
forces in one battle would also internationalize another separate
fight.1 4 The logic is that by engaging the government forces,
armed groups that would otherwise be fighting those forces
96 SrvAKumARAN, supra note 87, at 222-23.
97 Id. at 223-24.
98 Id. at 223.
9 Id.
100 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.),Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 94, 1 219 (June 27).
101 Id.
102 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
103 SivAKumARAN, supra note 87, at 223.
104 See Prosectur v. Blagkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, Including Declara-
tion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1 94 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar., 3, 2000).
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would be strategically "freed up. ' 10 5 As seen in Prosecutor v. Bla-
kic, "[by] engaging the ABiH in fighting outside the CBOZ, the
HV weakened the ability of the ABiH to fight the HVO in cen-
tral Bosnia. Based on Croatia's direct intervention in [Bosnia-
Herzegovina], the Trial Chamber finds ample proof to
characteri[ze] the conflict as international. ' 10 6 It was further
held in Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, that the incurring Croatian
armed forces, though made up in part by volunteer Croatians,
"would not affect the general finding by the Trial Chamber that
there were Croatian troops involved in the conflict" since "they
were Croatian citizens, militarily involved in the struggle be-
tween the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, in which
struggle Croatia was also involved."'01 7 This approach is not with-
out criticism, as observed by judge Shahabuddeen in Blaskic who
stated that, "it is difficult to see why an on-going internal armed
conflict should suddenly and necessarily lose that character alto-
gether because of foreign intervention."1081
There is criticism that both approaches are unsatisfactory and
that a better analysis would depend on the relationship between
the intervening state and the assisted group.10 9 Sandesh
Sivakumaran points to the violent situation in Libya in 2011 as
an example. °10 Although NATO intervened in order to protect
civilians on the side of the armed groups against Gaddafi's
forces, he asserted that whether NATO's intervention interna-
tionalized the conflict would depend on its relationship with the
rebel group.1
In Ukraine, the character and scope of Russian involvement is
publicly unknown. It is apparently paired with the separatists.1 2
This would superficially qualify for internationalizing this con-
flict under Nicaragua, but the full extent of the assistance is un-
105 See id.
106 Id.
107 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2,Judgment, 108 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001).
108 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T at 289 (Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen).
109 SrvAKuMARAN, supra note 87, at 224.
110 Id. at 225.
111 Id.
112 Terrence McCoy, Russian Troops Fighting in Ukraine? Naw. They're Just on "Va-
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proven.113 Indeed, Russian troops fighting on Ukraine soil are
doing so without publicly acknowledged government sanction,
though certainly with Russian sympathy. 14 Claims have surfaced
that they are using vacation time to fight for the separatists or
that they are retired military personnel.' 15 If true, this would
mean they are mercenaries, acting alone, and consequently fail
to elevate this conflict to IAC status. Of course, Russian provi-
sion of massive military equipment and sophisticated weaponry,
if proven, would cast doubt on these claims.1 1 6
b. The "Exerting Control" Limb
The level of "control" necessary to internationalize a conflict
is controversial. In Nicaragua, the ICJ held:
The Court has taken the view ... that United States participation,
even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing,
training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of
its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole
of its operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the
evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attrib-
uting to the United States the acts committed by the contras in
the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicara-
gua .... Such acts could well be committed by members of the
contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct
to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control
of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which
the alleged violations were committed."
In Tadic, the ICTY found that the control must be of an overall
character and comprise more than just financial assistance or mil-
itary equipment and training.1 ' The court opined that overall
control need not include issuing specific orders or planning for
113 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.),Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 94, 1 219 (June 27).
114 McCoy, supra note 112.
115 See id. (East Ukrainian pro-Russian separatist leader Alexander
Zakharchenko stated in an interview, "[a]mong us are fighting serving [Russian]
soldiers, who would rather take their vacation not on a beach but with us, among
brothers, who are fighting for their freedom."); see also SIvAKuMARAN, supra note
87, at 222-25.
116 See McCoy, supra note 112.
117 Nicar. v. US., 1986 I.C.J. 115 (emphasis added).
118 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 137 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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each operation or target, but rather, "l[t] he control required...
may be deemed to exist when a State . . . has a role in or-
gani[zing], coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping
or providing operational support to that group."119
The court cautioned that, "in [Nicaragua], the controlling
State is not the territorial State where the armed clashes occur
or where at any rate the armed units perform their acts, more
extensive and compelling evidence is required to show that the
State is genuinely in control.' 120 However, the court also ob-
served, " [w] here the controlling State in question is an adjacent
State with territorial ambitions on the State where the conflict is
taking place, and the controlling State is attempting to achieve
its territorial enlargement through the armed forces which it
controls, it may be easier to establish the threshold.' 121
This somewhat suggests a lower measure of control, removed
from the day-to-day actions and instead, concentrating on over-
all policy and objectives. In Ukraine, where this standard for
state responsibility would be compelling for internationalization
as the Ukrainian territory is adjacent to national Russian terri-
tory, the stated goal of the separatists is to annex the territory of
Ukraine into Russia, and the apparent policy considerations of
the Russian authorities is annexation (as evidenced by its annex-
ation of Crimea).122 This is further fueled by the alleged provi-
sion of military arms and training, and the presence of Russian
officers and troops fighting in Ukraine. 23 However, the evi-
dence of Russian organization is scant and the presence of high-
ranking Russian officers is vitiated by Russian participants alleg-




122 G.A. Res. 68/262, supra note 43, at 2; Press Release, General Assembly, Gen-
eral Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling Upon States Not to Recognize Changes
in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Press Release GA/11493 (Mar. 27, 2014) (not-
ing the resolution was supported by 100 U.N. member states, which affirmed the
U.N.'s recognition of Crimea as part of Ukraine; states voting against include
Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Russia, Sudan, Syria,
Venezuela and Zimbabwe); see also Guy Chazan, Separatists Urge Russia to Annex
Donetsk in Wake of Referendum, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 2014, 4:30 PM, http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/75b30b62-d9a-1 e3-b3e3-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3qwo7bKWI
[http://perma.cc/VW2X-VFNR] (noting that the resolution was adopted in re-
sponse to the Russian annexation of Crimea).
123 Donetsk Militants Say They "Will Have Army of 100,000 Men", supra note 47.
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ment. 124 Unless further evidence can be accumulated it is
unlikely that this could be internationalized under this test.
More importantly, the "overall control" test was rejected by
the ICJ as unpersuasive and unjustifiably expanding state re-
sponsibility in the 2007 case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro.125 The Court found that "[i]t must next be noted
that the 'overall control' test has the major drawback of broad-
ening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the funda-
mental principle governing the law of international
responsibility. ' 126 However, this decision was subtly crafted for
determining state responsibility only-not individual criminal li-
ability.127 The court distinguished its finding by observing "that
the ICTY was not called upon in the Tadic case, nor is it in gen-
eral called upon, to rule on questions of State responsibility,
since its jurisdiction is criminal and extends over persons
only. ' 12' Thus, an individual commander may technically assert
de facto effective control over troops under his authority, even if
there is no state responsibility attributed to his state of origin
and no superior liability attaches to its civilian authorities.
F. SUBORDINATE LIABILITY
Presuming an IAC, personal liability for the soldiers firing the
weapon would only vest if it could be proven that they knew and
intended to fire at a commercial jet.12 9 For example, if it could
be established that the perpetrators had a secondary radar sys-
tem in use that identified MH17 as a commercial airliner, then
such liability would vest.1 30 Yet, this seems unlikely in light of the
social media reports indicating a mistake and that the guidance
system was reportedly inadequate to properly identify the target
as civilian.1 31 Thus, they could rely on mistake or even following
orders as a defense. As a customary practice in criminal law, the
124 Id.
125 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.CJ. 210, 404
(July 11).
126 Id. 406.
127 See id. 403.
128 Id.
129 RS, supra note 77, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
130 See id. art. (8) (2) (b) (i), 30 (concluding that under these circumstances the
perpetrators could plausibly rely on a defense that they did not know how to
interpret the images on the secondary radar and therefore still lacked the neces-
sary intent to commit this war crime, but it may prove to be a weak defense).
131 Bennett, supra note 58; Luhn, supra note 63.
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defense of mistake, if honestly held, would serve to vitiate
guilt. 132 The following orders defense could also be viable: RS
Article 33(1) provides that a subordinate would be relieved of
guilt if they were under a legal obligation to obey orders, they
did not know the orders were unlawful, and the orders were not
manifestly unlawful.133 The limited evidence available suggests
that all three limbs of this test may be satisfied in the attack on
Flight MH17.
Alternatively, there are allegations that members of the rebel
forces justified the action by claiming (after the fact) that Flight
MH17 was carrying spies. Rebel leader Kozitsyn also responded,
"It]hey shouldn't be flying. There is a war going on . . ." and
" [w] e warned you not to fly in our skies. ' 134 These statements
may imply the insurgents were targeting all aircraft in the area,
military or civilian, rendering the mistake unconvincing, or it
may simply be a retrospective justification for shooting. These
statements also seem to ignore the fact that Flight MH17 was
flying above the restricted airspace. 13 5
If this were an NIAC, then individual liability would attach as
an ordinary crime under Ukrainian law as ajoint criminal enter-
prise. 136 Though mistaken, the perpetrators would still be held
accountable regardless of the identity of the victims. 13 7 Individ-
ual liability may also suffice for extradition purposes, if the
Ukrainian authorities consented, 131 under a passive nationality
132 International Committee of the Red Cross, Preparatory Commission for the In-
ternational Criminal Court Working Group on Elements of Crimes, PCNICC/1999/
WGEC/INF.2/Add.4 (Dec. 15, 1999), reprinted in KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF
WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
493, 495-96 (2003) (explaining ignorantia facti excusat, a well-established princi-
ple in numerous jurisdictions).
133 RS, supra note 77, art. 33 ("The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to"an order of a Govern-
ment or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of
criminal responsibility unless: (a) The person was under a legal obligation to
obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; (b) The person did
not know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly
unlawful.").
134 Luhn, supra note 63.
135 MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 37.
136 William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed
Conflict, 26 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 907, 918 (2003).
137 Criminal Code of Ukraine, art. 37(1-3), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
details.jsp?id=6087 [http://perma.cc/5DHL-DJQU].
138 Interested states that have extradition agreements with Ukraine include
The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium. See European Con-
vention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, C.E.T.S No. 024, http://www.coe.int/en/
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jurisdictional basis. Indeed, the Russian Federation is currently
holding a Ukrainian military pilot, Lieutenant Nadia Savchenko,
on this jurisdictional ground." 9
G. SUPERIOR LIABILITY
As indicated above, superior liability for Russian authorities is
difficult to establish as it requires a determination of control suf-
ficient to internationalize the conflict."' As discussed, making
this determination and amassing the necessary evidence to sup-
port it may be pragmatically impossible."' If this were an NIAC,
then superior responsibility would not vest, as it could not be
shown that Russian superiors, as opposed to commanders in the
field, exerted effective control over the actions of the separat-
ists.142 Despite the different effective control standard for state
responsibility and individual criminal liability, this issue is antici-
pated by claims that Russian soldiers in Ukraine are acting
independently.
RS Article 28(b) (i) further requires that "the superior either
knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indi-
cated that the subordinates were committing or about to com-
mit such crimes."14 This implies a slightly higher mens rea
burden of proof for superior responsibility than for command
responsibility, as seen below, and creates a difficult burden of
proof for any subsequent prosecution to meet. Satisfying this
burden would be unlikely.
H. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
From the limited evidence available, three suspects for com-
mand responsibility emerge. The first, Igor Girkin, also known
as Strelkov, 144 claimed responsibility on a popular Russian social-
web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680064587 [http://
perma.cc/CE5X-53HJ] (status as of Oct. 20, 2015). Canada also has an extradi-
tion agreement. See Treaty Between Canada and Ukraine on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters art. 7, Can.-Ukr., Sept. 23, 1996, C.T.S. 1999 No. 7, www.treaty-
accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101647 [http://perma.cc/8MPB-8MTW].
139 Rainsford, supra note 82.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 111, 118-29.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
142 RS, supra note 77, art. 28(b) (ii).
143 Id. art. 28(b)(i).
- Strelkov roughly translates into "rifleman." It was confirmed that he may
have participated in the atrocities committed in Bosnia. See Ukraine Crisis: Key
Players in Eastern Unrest, BBC, (Aug. 28, 2014), www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
america-27211501 [http://perma.cc/9LHK-PU39]; Gianluca Mezzofiore, Igor
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networking site for downing what he thought was a Ukrainian
military transport plane shortly before reports identified the tar-
get as a commercial jet. 4 5 Strelkov, an alleged Russian intelli-
gence agent and (retired) Colonel in the Russian armed forces
was allegedly leading the military forces of the Donetsk People's
Republic. 14 6 A second suspect is Igor Bezler, a notorious loose
cannon who purportedly rules the town of Horlivka with an iron
fist.14 7 The third suspect is Nikolai Kozitsyn; Kozitsyn commands
a group of Cossack fighters, "the traditional military caste that
once protected the borders of the Russian empire. '"148
RS Article 28(a) describes command liability:
A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and con-
trol as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly over such forces, where:
i. That military commander or person either knew or, owing
to the circumstances at the time, should have known that
the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and
ii. That military commander or person failed to take all nec-
essary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the mat-
ter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.'49
Strelkov: Key MHJ 7 Crash Suspect Linked to Massacre of 3,000 Bosnian Muslims in
1992, INT'L Bus. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/igor-strelkov-
key-mh 17-crash-suspect-linked-massacre-3000-bosnian-muslims-1992-1458304
[http://perma.cc/3QDL-FQGQJ. Strelkov is currently sanctioned by the EU. See
EU Names 15 New Targets for Sanctions, MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/Article-2615657/EU-names-15-new-targets-sanctions.
html [http://perma.cc/2U2A-7EVZ].
145 Paul Roderick Gregory, Smoking Guns: Russian Separatists Shot Down Malay-
sian Flight MH17; Putin Must be Held Responsible, FORBES (July 18, 2014, 12:22 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/201 4/07/18/smoking-guns-
russian-separatists-shot-down-malaysian-plane/ [http://perma.cc/SV9D-AQ3W].
146 Jeff Stone, Who Is Igor Strelkov? Russians Love Reenactor Turned Rebel Com-




147 Luhn, supra note 63.
148 Id.
149 RS, supra note 77, art. 28(a).
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In applying command responsibility to the downing of Flight
MH17 three issues arise: (1) whether command responsibility is
applicable to NIACs; (2) what is meant by "effective control" for
individual command responsibility; and (3) what is the neces-
sary mens rea for liability to vest.
1. Application in Non-International Armed Conflict
The international community has repeatedly called on leaders
of armed groups in NIACs to ensure accountability of their
members. 5 ° The Report of the International Commission of In-
quiry into the Conflict in Libya in 2011 urged the non-state
armed groups to "conduct exhaustive, impartial and public in-
vestigations into all alleged violations of international human
rights law and international humanitarian law."15' Similarly, mil-
itary groups in the 2006 Sudan conflict were called upon to
"prevent future violations by investigating the cases brought to
their attention and holding the perpetrators responsible. 1 52
Command responsibility is implicit in the definition of an
NIAC, as armed groups require some form of organization,
which "implies responsible command and that responsible com-
mand in turn imply command responsibility.' ' 53 International
rules on command responsibility are also applicable to NIACs:
In short, wherever customary international law recognizes that a
war crime can be committed by a member of an organi [z] ed mil-
itary force, it also recognizes that a commander can be penally
sanctioned if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate
was about to commit a prohibited act or had done so and the
commander failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such an act or to punish the subordinate. Customary
international law recognizes that some war crimes can be com-
mitted by a member of an organi[z]ed military force in the
150 Geoffrey S. Corn, Regulating Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts:
Thoughts on Bridging the Divide Between the Tadic Aspiration and Conflict Realities, 91
INT'L L. STUD. 281, 297 (2015).
15, Human Rights Council Report of the International Commission of Inquiry
to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the
Libyan ArabJamahiriya, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (June 1, 2011).
152 Gdspdr Bir6, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, Mr. Gdspdr Bir6, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1995/77, 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/62 (Feb. 20, 1996).
153 Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Com-
mand Responsibility, 17 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16,
2003).
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course of an internal armed conflict; it therefore also recognizes
that there can be command responsibility in respect of such
crimes. 1
54
Accordingly, under customary international law, command re-
sponsibility would accrue in the Flight MH17 case whether the
unrest in Ukraine was ultimately determined to be an NIAC or,
under treaty law, to be an IAC.
2. Effective Command and Control
The linchpin of command responsibility is whether the ac-
cused exercises de facto control of the troops committing the
crime such that the accused is able to prevent or punish
crimes."' This principle was laid out in Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mu-
cic, Delic, Landzo which held that "[t] he concept of effective con-
trol over a subordinate-in the sense of a material ability to
prevent or punish criminal conduct, however that control is ex-
ercised-is the threshold to be reached."'56 In Prosecutor v. Bla-
kic, the Appeals Chamber found the accused could not be held
liable for all the troops under his command because "the Appel-
lant did not enjoy or exercise effective command and control
over all the units nominally subordinated to him... [and there-
fore, could not] be held accountable for failing to punish mem-
bers of units over which he did not exercise effective control."1 57
Delalic, in which the court addressed the crimes committed in
the Celebici prison-camp, is relevant here.15 a Though dealing
with superior liability, Delalic nonetheless sheds light on effective
control applicable to command responsibility. 59 Delalic, a high-
ranking civilian official, was tried for crimes committed at the
prison camp, which was under the direct command of an-
other.160 Delalic's function was to transport weapons, supply ma-
terial, military equipment, food, communications equipment,
and provide for railroad access, transportation of refugees, the
linking up of electricity grids and to coordinate between civilian
154 Id. 18.
155 Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 573, 574 (1999).
156 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Ap-
pealJudgment, 256 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
157 Prosectur v. Bla.kic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 612 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
158 Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 1.
159 See id. 1 196.
160 Id. 2, 224, 313.
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and military personnel.1 6 ' The court found that Delalic was "a
well-placed influential individual, clearly involved in the local ef-
fort to contribute to the defen[s]e of the Bosnian State. [How-
ever], [t]his effort and the recognition which accompanied it
did not create a relationship of superior and subordinate be-
tween him and those who interacted with him. 162
Applying this case to the crash of Flight MH17, any of the
three suspects mentioned above-Strelkov, Bezler or Kozitsyn-
would be liable only if they were in a position of authority over
the troops firing the rocket, able to issue orders to the same,
and capable of meting out punishment for infractions.161 Mere
assistance or providing logistical support would be insuffi-
cient. 64 The nexus of command between Bezler and the rele-
vant troops is not publicly known. 165 The same may be said of
Kozitsyn, as the evidence leaked to the press concerning his dis-
missal of the event as a plane "carrying spies" does not necessa-
rily establish command authority or control over the relevant
troops.166
However, Strelkov allegedly took credit for downing what he
apparently thought was a Ukrainian aircraft, which turned out
to be Flight MH17.167 This admission implies command author-
ity, but is not dispositive. Moreover, because Strelkov's function
presumably consisted of supplying weapons and training, and if
the Buk missile originated from Russia, it is likely that Strelkov's
command sphere included the troops who fired the weapon at
Flight MH17 and were trained by him.168 It may also be deduced
that Strelkov or the troops who reported to Strelkov, as he was
informed of the action shortly after the fact, ordered the at-
tack.'69 This suggests command authority. However, difficulties
persist. Questions remain as to the exact nature and limitations
161 Id. 355.
162 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial
Judgment, 658 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
163 See Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A.
164 See id.; Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T.
165 Shaun Walker, An Audience with Ukraine Rebel Chief Igor Bezler, the Demon of
Donetsk, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2014, 6:59 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/j ul/29/-sp-ukraine-rebel-igor-bezler-interview-demon [http://
perma.cc/M5SG-6W5Q].
166 See Luhn, supra note 63.
167 See supra Section III.H.
168 MH17 Crash: "Old Buk Missile Used"-Russian Firm, BBC (June 2, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32972406 [http://perma.cc/Q6TU-
9BFG].
169 Luhn, supra note 63.
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of Strelkov's command, whether he had issued orders to down
all aircraft in the vicinity, his knowledge of the limits of the no-
fly zone and the routine presence of commercial aircraft above
the no-fly zone, and his authority to mete out punishment to
troops.17 ° Without further evidence of his culpability, making a
criminal case against Strelkov, by using the command responsi-
bility paradigm, would rely on conjecture.
3. Mens Rea- "Should Have Known that the Forces were
Committing or About to Commit Such Crimes"
Assuming that sufficient evidence of Strelkov's effective con-
trol could be produced, the prosecution would turn on mens
rea. Even if Strelkov did not know that the target was a commer-
cial jet, he may still have satisfied the mental element of the
crime under the "should have known" formula.171 Under RS Ar-
ticle 28(a) (i) and (ii), a commander may satisfy this require-
ment if he "either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or
about to commit such crimes; and.., failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or
repress their commission. ' 1 2 Thus, the prosecution would have
to satisfy two prongs: that Strelkov should have known that his
troops were about to commit a war crime and, that armed with
that knowledge, he failed to take steps to prevent it.
The "should have known" formula is not substantively differ-
ent from the "had reason to know" standard in the ICTY statute,
which in turn stems from Additional Protocol I and the Hostage
case.'73 This legal position goes back to the 1948 judgment by
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in
Tokyo.' 7 4 Authority for this approach can also be found in Arti-
cle 86(2) of the Protocol Additional relating to the protection of
170 See id.
171 RS, supra note 77, art. 28(a).
172 Id.
173 Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 866 (Antonio Cassese et al., eds., 2002).
174 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 3769 (Jean-Marie Henck-
aerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (providing "[t]hey had knowledge that
such crimes were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to
take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such
crimes in the future, or they are at fault in having failed to acquire such
knowledge").
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victims in international armed conflicts. 7 5 The French version
of the highlighted portion of the Protocol is given priority,
which reads, "information enabling them to conclude.' 76 Thus,
the level of knowledge required need only be constructive on
the part of the commander.
In the Blaskic case, the court found that "recklessness which
may be likened to serious criminal negligence" may suffice. 1 7 7
This is "negligence . . . so serious that it is tantamount to mali-
cious intent."178 Scholar Kai Ambos concluded that:
A superior who simply ignores information which clearly indi-
cates the likelihood of criminal conduct on the part of his subor-
dinates is seriously negligent in failing to perform his duty to
prevent or suppress such conduct by failing to make reasonable
effort to obtain the necessary information that will enable him to
take appropriate action.
1 79
In Delalic, the ICTY concluded that while there is not a strict
liability standard, a commander may be criminally liable if he
had knowledge "that his subordinates were about to commit or
had committed crimes."' 0 However, this case cautioned that
"uncertainty arises in relation to situations where the superior
lacks such information by virtue of his failure to properly super-
vise his subordinates.'' 181
As a commander arguably in effective control of the troops
firing on Flight MH17, Strelkov should have known that the Buk
missile system used by the separatist army lacked the necessary
safety mechanism of a secondary guidance system necessary to
distinguish commercial jets from viable military targets. In order
'75 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol
was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time,
that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.").
176 J. de Preux, Article 86-Failure to Act, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
1005, 1013 (Yues Sandoz et al. eds. 1987).
177 Prosectur v. Blagkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 1 152 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
178 See de Preux, supra note 176, at 1012.
179 Ambos, supra note 173, at 866.
180 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judg-
ment, 383 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
18, Id. 387.
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to prove this, a prosecutor would need to show that Strelkov had
sufficient information to enable him to conclude the Buk mis-
sile system could distinguish civilian planes from military
targets. 18 2 Such information could come in the form of media
accounts.' The argument that a commander never read re-
ports submitted by his subordinates is no defense. 184 Nor is tem-
porary absence from the command headquarters. 18 5 If Strelkov
was tasked with the duty of equipping and training troops in the
use of the Buk missile, he should have been aware of its target-
ing limits, the no-fly zone, and the routine commercial traffic
flying in airspace above the zone. Moreover, evidence from so-
cial media reports, referenced above, suggests that the separat-
ists had a "shoot first and ask questions later" policy. 8 6 While
Delalic was serving a purely ministerial or logistical function and
found to have no culpability, Strelkov, and perhaps others, was
in command, took credit for the kill, and trained the troops in
the use of the Buk missile. Moreover, troops reported to him
after the action because, presumably, the troops were answera-
ble to him. 187 The nature of Strelkov's self-proclaimed com-
mand responsibilities as such, and his multiple failures to
exercise reasonable care given the situation on the ground,
made this disaster highly probable. 18 Thus, the relatively low
mens rea burden of proving criminal negligence (rather than
specific intent) would be manageable for a prosecutor even
under the "fog of war." In the language of the Delalic case, the
information available to Strelkov "should have put him on no-
tice of the fact that an unlawful act was being, or about to be,
182 Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The
Chances For Successful Prosecution, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 191, 225 (1994).
183 Id. at 226.
184 United States v. Wilhelm List, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nurem-
berg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.10, Vol. XI/2 1230, 1271
(Feb. 19, 1948).
185 Id. at 1260.
186 See supra Section III.H.
187 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, TrialJudg-
ment, 1 657, 673, 696, 718 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16,
1998); Sneha Shankar, MH1 7 Crash Victims Sue Ukraine's Donetsk Peaple's Republic
Leader Igor Girkin For $900M, INr'L Bus. TIMES (July 16, 2015, 3:11 AM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/mh 17-crash-victims-sue-ukraines-donetsk-peoples-republic-lead
er-igor-girkin-900m-2011019 [http://perma.cc/EV2X-U9MV].
188 Aleksandar Vasovic et al., Elusive Muscovite with Three Names Takes Control of
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committed by a subordinate. ' 18 9 By failing to take the necessary
precautions for the safety of civilians, and given his imputed
knowledge of circumstances prevailing at the time, Strelkov
failed to exercise due diligence in the fulfilment of his duties.' 90
Additionally, while Delalic provides that prosecutorial uncer-
tainty may accrue if the leader lacks the relevant knowledge ow-
ing to his failure to properly supervise his troops, Strelkov's
knowledge of the relevant circumstances was unrelated to his
supervision of his troops."' He knew or should have known of
the safety deficits in the misused, ill-equipped missile system, the
no-fly zone limitations, and the heavy commercial air traffic
above that zone as well as the destructive capability of the Buk
missile (independently of his supervision of the troops), render-
ing Delalic distinguishable from this case.' 92
Under this interpretation, Strelkov failed to take necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the crime. For criminal lia-
bility to vest, there must be a causal link between the command
failure and the crime.19 "The requirement that the crimes of
the subordinate be 'a result' of the superior's 'failure to exercise
control properly' implies a causal relationship between the supe-
rior's failure and the subordinate's commission of crimes.' 19 4
Moreover, "[i] t is sufficient that the superior's failure of supervi-
sion increases the risk that the subordinates commit certain
crimes.' 19 5 The causal link in the Flight MH17 event, subject to
further investigation, is straightforward. Legal causation can be
established via Strelkov's failure to provide adequate training,
safety equipment in the guidance system for the rocket
launcher, and an established policy of no firing above the no-fly
189 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal
Judgment, 233 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
190 See Prosecutor v. Blagkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 332 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000) ("[I]f a commander has exercised due dili-
gence in the fulfilment of his duties yet lacks knowledge that crimes are about to
be or have been committed, such lack of knowledge cannot be held against him.
However, taking into account his particular position of command and the cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time, such ignorance cannot be a defen[s]e where
the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in the discharge of his du-
ties: this commander had reason to know within the meaning of the Statute.").
191 See supra text accompanying note 181.
192 Dave Majumdar, How Can a Civilian Plane Accidentally Be Shot Down?, TECH.
REVIEw (July 18, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/529156/how-
can-a-civilian-plane-accidentally-be-shot-down/ [http://perma.cc/N3ZW-BY6T].
193 RS, supra note 77, art. 25(2-4), 28(a).
194 See Ambos, supra note 173, at 860.
195 Id.
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zone, inter alia. 9 6 Thus, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to Strelkov, his acts of omission constitute negligence.
Acts of omission are sufficient for command liability. In
Halilovic, the Trial Chamber found that "command responsibil-
ity is responsibility for an omission."197 Liability for omissions
"arises for a superior from the moment he acquires knowledge
or has reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime is being or is
about to be committed."'9 Accordingly, on the information
available, Strelkov, and possibly other commanders, could have
the requisite mens rea of criminal negligence for command re-
sponsibility for their acts of omission by failing to take reasona-
ble measures. It is these failures that were the proximate cause
of the destruction of Flight MH17. Naturally, these conclusions
come with the caveat that an exhaustive criminal investigation is
absolutely necessary to uncover additional exculpatory or incul-
patory data.
IV. AVIATION ISSUES AND LIABILITY
A. WHO SHOULD CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION?
The state of occurrence, under the Chicago Convention, has
the right to conduct the air crash investigation.' 99 Article 26
vests Ukraine, the state of occurrence, with the responsibility to
conduct the investigation.20 ° It provides that "the state in which
the accident occurs will institute an enquiry. ' 20 The fact that
the territory is the subject of an insurgency cannot alter this situ-
ation, as the insurgents are not in a position to fulfill the criteria
for statehood over the disputed area.20 2
Ukraine delegated the accident investigations to the Nether-
lands Accident Investigation authorities. 20 3 Chapter 5 of Annex
13 to the Chicago Convention permits this course of action.20 4
196 See supra text accompanying notes 145, 192.
197 Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, 54 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005).
198 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, 373 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005).
199 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 26, Dec. 7, 1944, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
200 See id.
201 Id.
202 The alleged sovereignty of the insurgents is examined supra Section III.A.
203 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9.
204 Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annex 13 Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation 5.1 (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Annex 13].
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Paragraph 5.1 provides that the state of occurrence "may dele-
gate the whole or any part of the . . . investigation to another
State by mutual arrangement and consent. ' ' 2 5 Additionally, Par-
agraph 5.18 of Annex 13 specifies that the "State of Registry, the
State of the Operator, the State of Design and the State of Man-
ufacture shall each be entided to appoint an accredited repre-
sentative to participate. 2 °6 Malaysia also had a right to be a
party to the investigations as flag state of the aircraft under Arti-
cle 26 of the Chicago Convention.0 7
Other States, as provided for under Annex 13, may also par-
ticipate. 2°" According to the Final Report, the Dutch inquiry was
assisted by accredited representatives from Ukraine, Malaysia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the Rus-
sian FederationY
B. POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR PERCEIVED AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROL FAILURES
The Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise (Uk-
SATSE), is responsible for providing ATC services to aircraft fly-
ing through controlled airspace above Ukraine. ° Upon the
downing of Flight MH17, UkSATSE shut down air routes over
the disputed eastern part of the country. 21.1 In July, prior to the
downing of Flight MH17, several military aircraft had been shot
down in the vicinity.212 These included a Ukrainian AN-26 mili-
tary transport plane and a Su-25 war plane.213
Distinguished Professor Elmar Giemulla, representing a Ger-
man dependant of a passenger aboard Flight MH17, has an-
nounced her intention to sue Ukraine over its failure to close all
205 Id.
206 Id. 5.18.
207 Chicago Convention, supra note 199, art. 26.
208 Annex 13, supra note 204, 5.18.
209 See MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 7.
210 UKRAINIAN STATE AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES ENTERPRISE, uksatse.ua/index.php?
lang=EN [http://perma.cc/E65R-9RBR].
211 Croft, supra note 17.
212 Several Dead After Military Helicopter is Shot Down in Ukraine, DEUTSCHE WELLE
(June 24, 2014), http://www.dw.de/several-dead-after-military-helicopter-is-shot-
down-in-ukraine/a-17734474 [http://perma.cc/8U4Z-9CEC].
213 Victoria Butenko et al., Ukraine Says Russia Shot Down Military Plane; Moscow
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airspace above the Donetsk Oblast province. 214 At the time of its
shooting down, Flight MH17 was flying above the 32,000 foot
ceiling, below which airspace was temporarily restricted. 15 Arti-
cle 9 (Prohibited Areas) of the Chicago Convention provides
that States may restrict or prohibit other States from flying over
their territory for reasons of "military necessity or public
safety.'216 This right is also referenced in Annex 2 of the Chi-
cago Convention at 3.1.10.217
Reports suggest Giemulla is seeking $1.2 million in compensa-
tion, and intends to file a lawsuit against Ukraine in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights alleging "negligent homicide. 21 8
Giemulla has likely pursued this avenue for compensation be-
cause of a perception that Malaysia Airlines can establish, under
the Montreal Convention, that it was "not negligent" and,
hence, successfully defend liability above the 113,100 Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) cap. 219 He acknowledges Malaysia Air-
lines "reacted not unreasonably," while suggesting that "the cen-
tre of gravity of wrongs rests with the Ukraine. '221 U.S. lawyer,
Jerry Skinner, representing eight Australian families, is also con-
sidering this course of action but will not take action solely
against the Ukraine. 21 Potential claims against States, at this
214 Annika Breidthardt, Families of German MH17 Victims to Sue Ukraine: Lawyer,
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/21/us-
ukraine-crisis-mh 17-germany-idUSKBNOHGO8520140921 [http://perma.cc/6Q
ND-K79H].
215 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9, at 13.
216 Chicago Convention, supra note 199, art. 9 (providing that " [s]uch prohib-
ited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnec-
essarily with air navigation").
217 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 2, 3.1.10 (provid-
ing that "[a]ircraft shall not be flown in a prohibited area, or in a restricted
area.").
218 Australian Families Set to Launch Wide Ranging Lawsuit over MH17 Tragedy,
NEWS.COM.AU (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/au
stralian-families-set-to-launch-wide-ranging-lawsuit-over-mh 17-tragedy/story-fnizu
68q-1227143694292 [http://perma.cc/9J84-SAF7]; German Families to Sue Ukraine
over MH17 Deaths, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 21, 2014) http://www.dw.de/german-
families-to-sue-ukraine-over-mhl 7-deaths/a-17938210 [http://perma.cc/K8SQ-
FGTA].
219 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Montreal Convention of 1999 Working
Paper, 2.1, ICAO Doc. A38-WP/170 (an SDR of 113,110 is approximately U.S.
$170,000 as of April 2013).
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stage, are circumscribed by the difficulties in obtaining defini-
tive evidence that confirms their international wrongfulness.
C. EUROCONTROL
Malaysia Airlines has asserted that Eurocontrol had accepted
Flight MH17's route over Ukraine at an altitude of 35,000 feet,
but noted that Ukrainian controllers had the flight fly at 33,000
feet instead.222 Malaysia Airlines has further maintained that the
aircraft was in airspace that had been deemed safe by both the
ICAO and the IATA.223 These comments tend to focus attention
on the role of each of these bodies, and arguably, flag possible
dysfunction within the overall system.
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
(Eurocontrol) is an intergovernmental organization established
under the Eurocontrol Convention in 1960 to coordinate and
plan air traffic control for all of Europe.224 It currently has forty-
one member States. 225 Eurocontrol's self-acknowledged objec-
tive is "to deliver a Single European Sky that will help overcome
the safety, capacity and performance challenges facing Euro-
pean aviation in the 21st century. ' 226 One of Eurocontrol's
objectives is to "facilitate civil-military coordination and cooper-
ation in European air traffic management. ' 227 Eurocontrol pos-
sesses full legal personality. 221
A Eurocontrol spokesperson emphasized that the decision lay
solely with Ukraine to keep Ukrainian airspace above the alti-
tude of 9,753 meters open. 229 The spokesperson characterized
Eurocontrol as "playing the role of a network manager. '2 0
Eurocontrol's position is consistent with the traditional rights of
222 Croft, supra note 17.
223 Id.
224 See "Eurocontrol" International Convention Relating to Co-operation for
the Safety of Air Navigation, Dec. 13, 1960, 523 U.N.T.S. 117.
225 See Who We Are, EUROCONTROL, http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/who-
we-are [http://perma.cc/2427-6F57] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015)
226 See What We Do, EUROCONTROL, http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/our-
role [http://perma.cc/N6YQ-UFJ4] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
227 See Our Areas of Expertise, EUROCONTROL, http://www.eurocontrol.int/arti
cles/our-areas-expertise [http://perma.cc/Q3Fr-TNH5] (last visited Nov. 21,
2015).
228 Pablo Mendes de Leon, The Relationship Between Eurocontrol and the EC: Liv-
ing Apart Together, 4 INT'L ORG. L. REv. 305, 307-08 (2007).
229 Alexander Mosesov, Eurocontrol Denies Warning Kiev of Airspace Threats Prior to




A CALL FOR LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
States as embodied in Articles 1 (Sovereignty), 6 (Scheduled Air
Services) and 28 (Air Navigation Facilities and Standard Sys-
tems) of the Chicago Convention.2 1 However, as Jakob Wurm
observes, "Eurocontrol has been vested with certain sovereign
rights by its Member States in order to exercise important tasks
relating to civil air transportation. In particular, it provides coor-
dination of and control measures for air traffic services on the
basis of a jointly administered air traffic system. 23 2
De Leon notes that in 2003, "Eurocontrol and the [European
Community] Commission concluded a Memorandum Concern-
ing a Framework for Cooperation. '233 According to De Leon,
the framework identified "areas of cooperation as priority ar-
eas," which included "safety and security, [and] human re-
sources including Air Traffic Control. '23 4 The memorandum
declared, "that it does not create rights and obligations under
international law. '2 5 However, there is a clear and profound in-
teraction between Eurocontrol competence, communication
and direction, and the exercise of sovereign rights by Member
States of Eurocontrol. In the wake of the Flight MH17 incident,
Eurocontrol initiated the steps that activated the European Avia-
tion Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC), enabling EACCC "to co-
ordinate the response to the impact of the airspace closure.
2 36
Norwegian commentator Einar Sorensen has argued for a
broader role of Eurocontrol with respect to establishing air
safety zones and airspace restrictions.23 7 Sorensen argued that "it
was too risky to depend on countries' own assessments of their
airspace security, and Eurocontrol should take over the task.
23 8
231 Chicago Convention, supra note 199, art. 1, 6, 28. Interestingly, "[n]either
Eurocontrol nor the EC is a party to the Chicago Convention." See de Leon, supra
note 228, at 306.
232 Jakob Wurm, Asking National Courts to Correct the Overflight Charges of Eurocon-
trol, in CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL
COURTS 158-59 (August Reinisch ed., 2010).
233 De Leon, supra note 228, at 312.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 313.
236 Croft, supra note 17.
237 Emily Woodgate, Eurocontrol Could Have Saved MH1 7, NEWSINENGLISH.No
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D. IATA AND INDUSTRY ISSUES
The LATA is a key player in all international aviation issues.
IATA carriers comprise most of the world's airlines. 239 While
IATA primarily represents the interests of its members, it has
played an important role in seeking and contributing to reforms
in international civil aviation. Its Intercarrier Agreements in the
1960s and 1970s, in which IATA carriers waived defenses and
provided a higher level of recovery than available under the
Warsaw Convention, kept the United States within the Warsaw
system. 240 The IATA Intercarrier Agreements of the mid-1990s
paved the way for the introduction of recovery in the first tier of
liability for up to 100,000 SDR.241
Shortly after the Flight MH17 incident, Tony Tyler, IATA's
Director General and CEO, stated that "[g]overnments and air
navigation service providers inform airlines about routes that
they can fly and with what restrictions. Airlines comply with that
guidance."242 IATA, along with the Civil Air Navigation Services
Organization (CANSO), the Airports Council International
(ACI) and ICAO, then issued a Joint Statement on Risks to Civil
Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones.243 The statement called
for ICAO to establish a senior-level task force to address the
challenges posed by the Flight MH17 incident, and to establish
"fail-safe channels for essential threat information to be made
available to civil aviation authorities and industry," as well as "in-
corporating into international law, through appropriate UN
frameworks, measures to govern the design, manufacture and
deployment of modern anti-aircraft weaponry." 244
239 See Current Airline Members, 1ATA, http://www.iata.org/about/pages/index.
aspx [http://perriia.cc/5MDE-FUTM] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) ("representing
some 260 airlines or 83% of total air traffic").
240 See S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-14 at vi.
241 See Montreal Convention of 1999 Working Paper, supra note 219 (providing
recovery in its first tier of 113,110 SDR, or approximately U.S. $170,000 as of
April 2013).
242 Karen Walker, IA TA Chief: AMI 7 was an Attack Against the Air Transport Sys-
tem, AIJR TRANSPORT WORLD (July 22, 2014), http://atwonline.com/blog/iata-
chief-mhl 7 -was-attack-against-air-transport-system [http://perma.cc/6K3B-VK
QW].
243 Press Release, IATA et al.,Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising
from Conflict Zones (July 29, 2014), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/
201 4 -07-29-02.aspx [http://perna.cc/A45M-YAHU].
244 Id.
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E. THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Prior to the Flight MH17 incident, ICAO "issued a State Let-
ter advising States and their air operators of a potentially unsafe
situation arising from the presence of more than one air traffic
service provider in the Simferopol Flight Information Region
(FIR) .,245 However, ICAO acknowledged after the event that the
loss of Flight MH17 occurred outside of the Simferopol FIR.246
A burning issue coming out of the Flight MH17 shoot down
was the need to take concerted action in the face of this type of
danger. On October 28, 2014, the ICAO passed a council resolu-
tion condemning the downing of Flight MH17,247 and issued a
Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation from Conflict
Zones.248
F. THE ICAO "AFTER THE EVENT" LETTER
A particular ICAO letter, dated July 24, 2014, focuses on the
safety and security of civil aircraft operating in airspace affected
by conflict. 249 The letter emphasizes the need for: "[C] lose coor-
dination between civil and military authorities in the event of
armed conflict or the potential for armed conflict; and [the
need to] restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other
States from flying over your territory for reasons of military ne-
cessity or public safety."250
The letter reminds States that Article 9 of the Chicago Con-
vention empowers States to restrict or prohibit uniformly the
aircraft of other States from flying over its territory.251 The ICAO




247 See Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Council Resolution on Malaysia Airlines
Flight MH1 7, Destroyed Over Eastern Ukraine On 17July 2014 (Oct. 28, 2014), http:/
/www.icao.int/newsroom/newsdoc20l4/council%20resolution%20on%20malay
sia%20airlines%20flight%20mh17.pdf [http://perma.cc/E3MF-33A3] (noting
passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2166 on July 21, 2014).
248 Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones, supra
note 243.
249 Letter from Raymond Benjamin, ICAO Secretary General, to State Civil Au-
thorities (July 24, 2014), http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/NewsDoc2014/059e.
pdf [http://perma.cc/FS9T-BTL8].
250 Id. at 1.
251 Id. 2 (noting that "[s]uch prohibited areas, if needed, shall be of reasona-
ble extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation.
Notices to airmen (NOTAM) or other communications containing the necessary
information, advice and measures to be taken should then be issued").
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also uses this letter to stress the point that this is an area of State
responsibility: "The responsibility for initiating the coordination
process rests with the State whose military forces are engaged in
the conflict. The responsibility for instituting special measures
to assure the safety and security of international civil aircraft op-
erations remains with the State responsible for providing air
traffic services .... 252
G. THE HIGH-LEVEL SAFETY CONFERENCE
A High-level Safety Conference of ICAO Member States (at-
tended by 120 Member States and observers from thirty-five in-
ternational organizations) took place in February 2015.253 This
conference discussed "emerging safety issues, including the
global tracking of aircraft and risks to civil aviation arising from
conflict zones. ' 254 In his opening address, Dato' Azharuddin Ab-
dul Rahman, Director General of Civil Aviation of Malaysia, re-
minded the audience of the role of Article 3 bis from the
Chicago Convention, which prohibits the use of weapons against
civil aircraft in flight.255
The Report of the Second High-Level Safety Conference 2015
includes an agreement that "[t]he tragic loss of Flight MH17
highlights the necessity to provide accurate and timely informa-
tion to States and airlines regarding risks to civil aviation arising
from conflict zones as a matter of urgency," and the "urgent
need to utilize and enhance existing mechanisms for the pur-
pose of sharing critical information related to airspace use re-
strictions that are associated with conflict zones to ensure robust
risk assessments. "256
H. COMPARISON WITH FAA RESPONSE
One useful point of comparison between the ICAO and
Ukrainian responses is provided by the FAA's response to the
insurgency in the Ukraine. The FAA on April 3, 2014, issued a
252 Id. 3.
253 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Second High-level Safety Conference 2015 Re-
port, at ii-I (2015), http://www.icao.int/meetings/hlsc2015/documents/reports/
10046_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/8U8W-ZYU7].
254 See id. at vi-1.
255 See Second High-level Safety Conference 2015 Opening Address, Dato'
Azharuddin Abdul Rahman, Director General of Civil Aviation of Malaysia, http:/
/www.icao.int/Meetings/HLSC2015/Documents/Statements/Opening%2ORe
marks%20%E2%80%93%2OMalaysia.pdf [http://perma.cc/BFX8-6KW8].
256 Second High-level Safety Conference 2015 Report, supra note 253, at 3-3.
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warning in FDC Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 4/2816 about the
disputed air zone, indicating that "Russia's claim to the airspace
over Ukraine's Crimea could lead to conflicting air traffic con-
trol instructions. '257 Several weeks later, "the FAA issued a
tougher warning, telling pilots not to fly over the area. '258 This
NOTAM, FDC NOTAM 4/7667 (A0012/14), related to airspace
above Crimea, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov.259 However,
as observed in the final crash report, "[t]he warning pertaining
to the remainder of Ukraine was formulated in general terms
and did not contain any specific information about the armed
conflict and the potential risks it could present to civil avia-
tion. "26 ° In contrast, the ICAO's warning was instead directed to
governments advising them of the need to warn their airlines. 261
I. FINAL REPORT CRITIQUE OF ICAO
While acknowledging ICAO's heavy reliance on State-pro-
vided information and that no request for assistance was re-
ceived from the Ukraine, the Dutch Safety Board still expressed
a reservation associated with ICAO's handling of matters. In par-
ticular, ICAO's letter to Simferopol FIR (Crimea) on April 2,
2014, "stated [the ICAO] would continue to actively coordinate
with the parties active in the region with respect to the develop-
ments in the realm of flight safety. ' 2 6 2 The Dutch Safety Board
suggested that this letter had created expectations that ICAO
would take further action if the threat increased.263 However,
ICAO was inactive: "In the Dutch Safety Board's opinion, it
would have been appropriate . . .for ICAO to have requested
257 David Koenig & Scott Mayerowitz, Hight MH1 7: Why Airlines Didn't Avoid
Risky Ukraine Airspace, GLOBAL NEWS (July 18, 2014), http://globalnews.ca/news/
1458755/fligh t-mh 17-disaster-could-force-airlines-into-costly-route-changes/
[http://perma.cc/62DP-4MTY]; see also Press Release, FAA, FAA State-
ment-Expanded Notice to Airmen Released (July 17, 2014), http://www.faa.gov
/news/pressreleases/newsstory.cfm?newsld=16655&cid=TW233 [http://
perma.cc/K5R6-R7T3] (prohibiting U.S. flight over the Simferopol (UKFV) and
Dnepropetrovsk (UKDV) Flight Information Regions (FIR)). The precise words
of this advice are "the potential exists for civil aircraft to receive confusing and
conflicting ATC instructions while operating in the disputed airspace," referring
to airspace above the Crimean peninsula. FAA, FDC Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)
4/2816 (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.nbaa.org/ops/intl/mid/FDC-NOTAM.pdf.
258 Koenig & Mayerowitz, supra note 257.
259 MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 179.
260 Id.
261 Koenig & Mayerowitz, supra note 257.
262 MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 227.
263 Id.
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clarification from Ukraine and/or offered its services, in rela-
tion to the statements made by the Ukrainian authorities about
the Antonov An-26 being shot down on 14 July."264
J. THE NETHERLANDS AND THE PRELIMINARY ACCIDENT REPORT
The release of the Preliminary Report regarding the crash
represents a significant achievement on the part of the Dutch
Safety Board, especially given the problems associated with the
crash site's location in a region of disputation held by separatist
forces. The evidence considered includes aircraft maintenance
data, flight operational data, images available publically and ob-
tained from the National Bureau of Air Accidents Investigation
of Ukraine and the Australian Federal Police, satellite imagery,
ATC surveillance data obtained from the UkSATSE, and ATC
surveillance data from the Russian Federation.265 The Prelimi-
nary Report concluded that the "pattern of damage ... was con-
sistent with the damage that would be expected from a large
number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from
outside. 266 A key deduction of the Preliminary Report in Part 3
(Summary of Findings) noted it was likely "that this damage re-
sulted in a loss of structural integrity of the aircraft, leading to
an in-flight break up."267
Due to the preliminary nature of this report, care must be
exercised in analysing its findings. The Dutch investigatory au-
thorities were careful not to attribute responsibility to a Buk
anti-aircraft missile.268 The Dutch Safety Board has suggested
"[the] investigation into the cause of the accident is in full pro-
gress and focuses on many more sources than only the shrap-
nel. ' 269 At the time of the Preliminary Report not all data had
264 Id. at 228.
265 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9.
266 Id. at 25.
267 Id. at 30.
268 See id.
269 See Amanda Macias, More Proof That a Russian BUK Missile Shot Down Passen-
gerPlane MHI 7, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-
fragment-from-mhl 7-crash-site-supports-missile-theory-dutch-tv-2015-3 [http://
perma.cc/VVL9-Q4JV]; see also MH17: Dutch Team to Return to Ukraine Crash Site to
Collect More Remains, ABC (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-01-
24/dutch-team-to-search-for-more-remains-at-mh 17-crash-site/6044064 [http://
perma.cc/MQG4-HGQM] (noting that the Dutch prosecution service is concur-
rently conducting a criminal investigation of the incident).
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been analyzed and therefore, does not claim to provide a defini-
tive analysis.27 °
Recently, Dutch journalistJeroen Akkermans has alleged that
an object he took from the crash site bears a discernible Russian
marking.271 He reports that he has now conveyed this object to
Dutch authorities.2 72 While Akkermans' contention may carry
persuasive value in the arena of public opinion, most prudent
observers patiently wait on the final report.
K. THE FINAL CRASH REPORT CRITICAL FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
After comprehensive analysis, including the conduct of sev-
eral simulations, the Dutch Safety Board concluded that "the
aeroplane was struck by a 9N314M warhead as carried on a
9M38-series missile and launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile
system. 278 While acknowledging that the Buk missile could have
been launched from a 320 square kilometer area in the east of
Ukraine, the final crash report noted the need for further foren-
sic research to determine the exact launch location.274 Perti-
nently, the Dutch Safety Board also noted that this investigatory
work fell "outside the mandate of the Dutch Safety Board, both
in terms of Annex 13 [of the Chicago Convention] and the
Kingdom Act 'Dutch Safety Board'. 275
The Dutch Safety Board in its Final Report emphasized the
need for ICAO to take "a stronger, more proactive role" in air-
space management in conflict zones.276 It argues for a "stricter
redefinition of the responsibility of states for their airspace. "277
This would necessitate amendment of the Chicago Convention,
including the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS)
in the Annexes, to require states dealing with armed conflict to
publish information outlining "the nature and extent of threats"
at an earlier date.278 The Dutch Safety Board also envisaged
ICAO issuing a State Letter where a state dealing with an armed
270 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
271 Jeroen Akkermans, MIHI 7 Crash: My Revealing Fragments from East Ukraine,
BBC (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32283378 [http:/
/perma.cc/7SV5-HG3P].
272 Id.
273 MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 137.
274 Id. at 144, 147.
275 Id. at 147.
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conflict fails to provide such information. 27 9 Further, the Dutch
Safety Board recommended a toughening of the regulatory re-
gime by way of converting non-mandatory Recommended Prac-
tices into Standards in order to mandate compliance. 28 ° The
Dutch Safety Board's Recommendation 6, related to risk assess-
ment, calls upon ICAO to "[a]mend relevant Standards so that
risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the
airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict
zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be in-
cluded in these risk assessments .... ",281 In terms of operator
accountability, the Dutch Safety Board has called for greater
levels of public accountability for routes chosen.28 2
L. THE INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION ON SHOOTING DOWN
CIVIL AIRCRAFT
Past incidents involving the downing of civil aircraft in the
post-World War II period include: (i) the Soviet Union shooting
down a French Commercial Airliner; (ii) China shooting down a
Cathay Pacific flight; (iii) Bulgaria shooting down an El AL air-
liner; (iv) the Soviet Union shooting down Korean Airlines
Flight 902; (v) the Soviet Union shooting down Korean Airlines
Flight 007; and (vi) the United States shooting down Iran Air
Flight 655.283
Mistaken aircraft identification is a feature of several of the
above incidents. In 1954, a Chinese fighter fired on a Cathay
Pacific flight traveling between Bangkok and Hong Kong.284
China argued that its military had mistakenly identified the civil
aircraft as a Nationalist Chinese military aircraft sent to attack a
Chinese military base at Port Yulin.285 In this case, "the Chinese
apologized for the incident and agreed to pay compensation for
the resulting losses. 286
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 265.
282 Id. at 266.
283 Brian E. Foont, Shooting Down Civilian Aircraft: Is there an International Law?
72J. AIR L. & COM. 695, 704-15 (2007); see also Craig A. Morgan, The Shooting of
Korean Air Lines Flight 007: Responses to Unauthorised Aerial Incursions, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAw THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 204-212 (W.
Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 2014).
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The second incident involved the shooting down of KAL007
by the Soviet Union over the Sea of Japan when the aircraft
strayed into Soviet airspace near military facilities on Sakhalin
Island.28 7 A Soviet military jet shot down the aircraft killing all
269 persons on board. 28 The Soviet Union secreted the flight
data recorder, and a first accident investigation, without access
to the black box, was conducted under the auspices of ICAO. 9
At that time, "the Soviet Union refused to accept full responsi-
bility for the downing, ignored U.S. demands for compensation,
and went virtually unpunished for the attack. ' 290 With the de-
mise of the old Soviet Union, a second accident investigation
was conducted. The Boris Yeltsin-led Russian Federation pro-
vided the black box, which made a more complete investigation
possible. 291 At the time of the second investigation, Yeltzin
characterised the KAL007 tragedy as involving "the most horri-
ble catastrophe of the Cold War. '29 2 Despite this seemingly une-
quivocal statement, a subsequent Russian inquiry essentially
resurrected their prior position on KAL007.293
M. THE ARTICLE 3 BIS PROHIBITION
The downing of KAL007 was met with widespread interna-
tional condemnation and some countries implemented sanc-
tions against the Soviet Union.294 The ICAO Council met in
September 1983 and passed a resolution deploring the use of
armed force against civil aircraft.295 On May 10, 1984, the ICAO
287 Korean Airlines Hight Shot Down by Soviet Union, HISTORY, http://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/korean-airlines-flight-shot-down-by-soviet-
union [http://perma.cc/HL6N-MNE9] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
288 Id.
289 Thom Patterson, The Downing of Flight 007: 30 Years Later, a Cold War Tragedy
Still Seems Surreal, CNN (Aug. 31, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/31/
us/kal-fight-007-anniversary/ [http://perma.cc/3ZZG-45P7].
290 Douglas A. Ewing, The Downing of Iran Air Flight 655: Highlighting the Need for
International Adjudication of Damages, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 656, 663 (1990).
291 John-Thor Dahlburg, Yeltsin Tells of Soviet Atrocities: Legacy: Russian Releases
Documents on 1983 Downing of KAL Jetliner and the Mass Murder of Polish Officers in
WWII. Gorbachev is Blamed for Suppressing Secrets, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 1992), http:/
/Articles.latimes.com/ 1992-10-15/news/mn-395- 1 polish-officers [http://
perma.cc/XZW7-7GE4].
292 Id.
293 Masahiko Kido, The Korean Airlines Incident on September 1, 1983, and Some
Measures Following It, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 1049, 1056 (1997).
294 Foont, supra note 283, at 708.
295 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Resolution Adopted by the Extraordinary Ses-
sion of the Council of the ICAO on September 16, 1983 (1983).
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Assembly amended the Chicago Convention by adding a new
Article 3 bis, which stated a prohibition on the use of force
against civil aircraft.296
ICAO member States were slow to ratify Article 3 bis, and it
was not until October 1998 that it entered into force.297 ICAO
also developed specific procedures, signals and rules to guide
states in implementing interceptions of civil aircraft if deemed
necessary.298 These were contained in its "Manual Concerning
Interception of Civil Aircraft," and included in amendments to
Annexes 2, 6, 10 and 11 of the Chicago Convention. 299
N. THE U.S.S. VINCENNES INCIDENT 300
During the 1988 Iran/Iraq conflict, the U.S.S. Vincennes (Vin-
cennes) was patroling the Strait of Hormuz on a mission to pro-
tect oil tankers. 30 1 Following an attack on the U.S.S. Stark by an
Iraqi military jet, the Vincennes mistook Iran Air flight 655 for a
military aircraft, and after attempts to communicate with the air-
craft on the wrong frequency, shot the aircraft down, killing all
on board.30 2 The incident was headed for the International
Court of Justice before Iran and the United States settled and
withdrew the matter.30 3 As Paul Dempsey observed, "[n]ot only
was the U.S. legal case poor, its moral position was miserable. 30 4
In the wake of this incident, on an ex gratia basis and without
acknowledging legal liability, the Reagan Administration made
payments of around $300,000 per family to the dependents of
296 Chicago Convention, supra note 199, art. 3 bis.
297 Id.
298 Kido, supra note 293, at 1067-68.
299 Id.
300 Max Fisher, The Forgotten Story of Iran Air Flight 655, WASH. POST (Oct. 16,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/16/
the-forgotten-story-of-iran-air-flight-655/ [http://perma.cc/NAE6-XVKX].
10 George C. Wilson, Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jetliner, WASH. POST (July 4,
1988), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flight801/sto
ries/july88crash.htm.
302 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Flights of Fancy and Fights of Fury: Arbitration and
Adjudication of Commercial and Political Disputes in International Aviation, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 231, 293 (2004) ("Until minutes before the missile launch, mili-
tary transmissions from the Vincennes warning the incoming aircraft had not been
received by Iran Air 655, for they had been broadcasting on military
frequencies.").
303 Shapour Ghasemi, Shooting Down Iran Air Flight 655 [IR655], IRAN CHAMBER
SOCIETY (2004), http://www.iranchamber.com/history/Articles/shootingdown-
iranair__flight655.php [http://perma.cc/2376-BJXE].
304 Dempsey, supra note 302, at 293.
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the deceased victims.305 At this time, the United States stated
that the following principles applied to such events: "(1) indem-
nification is not required for injuries or damage incidental to
the lawful use of armed force; (2) indemnification is required
where the exercise of armed force is unlawful; and (3) states
may, nevertheless, pay compensation ex gratia without acknowl-
edging, and irrespective of, legal liability. '3 6 While the position
adopted by the United States is contentious, it demonstrates a
situation where a State makes gratuitous payments to the rela-
tives of deceased passengers.
The Cathay Pacific incident also endorses making payments
where a State has erroneously shot down a commercial air-
liner.3 07 A further incident, in October 2001, in which a Ukrain-
ian missile shot down a commercial aircraft en route from Tel
Aviv to Russia, saw the Ukraine make payments of $200,000 per
family to the families of deceased individuals. 08 Consequently,
there is state practice suggesting the making of such payments.
This surely presents as an option, although it may arguably as yet
fall short of representing a customary international law
obligation.
0. RELEVANCE OF AVIATION SECURITY CONVENTIONS ON ISSUES
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Where command or State responsibility cannot be estab-
lished, the legal position becomes problematic. However, avia-
tion security conventions dealing with unlawful interference in
civil aviation, namely those secured in Tokyo (1963), The Hague
(1970), and Montreal (1971), may potentially come into play.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention of 1971)30 is
in force in each State most integrally involved in the Flight
MH17 incident. 10 In Article 1 (b) of the Montreal Convention
305 Id. at 294.
306 Foont, supra note 283, at 712.
307 Id. at 716.
308 Id.
309 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Montreal Convention of 1971].
310 The Montreal Convention of 1971 is in force in each of the following
States: The Ukraine (Jan. 26, 1973), the Russian Federation (Feb. 19, 1973), Ma-
laysia (May 4, 1985), the Netherlands (Aug. 27, 1973) and Australia (July 12,
1973). See Status List, ICAO, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation Signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971,
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of 1971, it states that an individual commits an offense if he or
she unlawfully and intentionally destroys an aircraft. 11 The juris-
dictional options include the State in whose territory the offense
is committed (correctly applied in this instance, the Ukraine)
and also the State of registration or "flag State" of the aircraft
(in this instance, Malaysia).312 Effective implementation of the
Convention by an obtuse State may still be problematic. The ob-
ligation imposed by the Convention in Article 7 is to "submit
without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
through proceeding in accordance with the laws of that
State."31 Article 7 is practically worded, but there is still scope
for its obstruction by cynical State authorities.
P. MALAYSIA AIRLINES BLAMEWORTHINESS
In this context, there has been considerable international fo-
cus on the actual carrier, Malaysia Airlines. In the lead up to the
final crash report, and in the wake of the preliminary crash re-
port, the popular media was quick to point the finger of blame
in the direction of Malaysia Airlines. 14 In the context of legal
liability, it is pertinent to note the obersvations of the Dutch
Safety Board in the final crash report. First, the report noted
that "Malaysia Airlines complied with all standards relevant to
'air operators' ... [including] ICAO standards and national reg-
ulations. '31 5 Second, the report also noted that while Malaysia
Airlines based its decision to fly over the eastern part of Ukraine
"virtually exclusively on aeronautical information [contained in
NOTAMs] and did not perform its own additional risk assess-
ment," it was "not in a unique situation." '16 The Board conceded
that "there were many operators that were still flying over the
conflict area. ' 31 7 It is the authors' understanding that only one
operator, Qantas, had ceased flying over the Ukraine at the time
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%2OParties/Mtl7l-EN.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015).
311 Montreal Convention of 1971, supra note 295, art. 1(b).
312 Id.
313 Id. art. 7.
314 See, e.g., Tom Batchelor, MH1 7 Crash Caused by Pro-Russian Rebels but Malay-
sia Airlines to Blame Too, Says Report, ExPREss (July 15, 2015), http://www.express.
co.uk/news/world/591469/MH17-Malaysia-Airlines-pro-Putin-rebels-blamed-
crash.
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of the incident."i Coincidentally, both Malaysia Airlines and
Qantas are linked in the One World Alliance with code sharing
occurring on certain routes.319 In the case of MH17, there were
"two passengers with a Qantas ticket"3 20 indicating the intercon-
nectedness of contemporary air travel and the need to address
issues such as those posed by the MH17 incident at a systemic
level.
Q. PASSENGER ISSUES
Flight MH17 was international in nature. When it was shot
down, it had departed the Netherlands and flown over several
countries en route to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. Individual tick-
ets inevitably will reveal different destinations, some being Ma-
laysia on round trip tickets, others being Australia or the
Netherlands on round trip tickets. On such international flights,
the liability of the air carrier to passengers is governed by con-
ventions, either the Warsaw Convention3 2' or the Montreal Con-
vention (1999).322 Here, the Montreal Convention (1999) is in
force in the Netherlands (from June 28, 2004), Australia (from
January 24, 2009) and Malaysia (from February 29, 2008).323
Where there is clearly international carriage under Article 1 of
the Montreal Convention, and there are a sufficient number of
appropriate jurisdictional options under Article 33 of the Con-
vention, there is still the need to satisfy the requirements of Arti-
318 There are reports suggesting that Korean Air, Asiana, and China Airlines
had also rerouted aircraft but there was no clarification at the time of this writing
as to whether the rerouting only related to the Crimea region. See, e.g., Flight
MH17 Took Abandoned Flight Path, SKY NEWS (July 18, 2014), http://www.skynews.
com.au/news/top-stories/2014/07/18/flight-mh 17-took-abandoned-flight-path.
html.
319 See Member Airlines, ONEWORLD, https://www.oneworld.com/member-air
lines/overview (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
320 MH17 CRASH REPORT, supra note 56, at 56, 213.
321 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2001), as amended by the Montreal
Protocol [hereinafter the Warsaw Convention].
322 The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL 33292734 (2000)
[hereinafter Montreal Convention of 1999].
323 See Status List, ICAO, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
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cle 17 of the Convention for air carrier liability to be
established.
Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention provides that "[tlhe
carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident
which caused the death or injury took place on board the air-
craft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking. ' 324 In the context of the Flight MH17 incident, it
is uncontentious that "death" has occurred to individuals who
were "passengers," and that death occurred while they were "on
board" the aircraft. What is more problematic in a technical
sense is whether there was an "accident" under the Convention.
The word "accident" is not defined by the Convention and
therefore, courts consistently rely on the language set forth by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in the U.S. Supreme Court case
Air France v. Saks.3 25 In Saks, Justice O'Connor concluded that
"liability under Article 17... arises only if a passenger's injury is
caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger. '326 According to Ronald Schmid, the
objective of Article 17 "is to cover the typical risks in air carriage
only. ' 32 7 If this conceptualization is accorded its ordinary mean-
ing, then carriers ought not be responsible where a civil aircraft
is shot down, either by another aircraft or by a missile. Under
this argument, there is also a failure of causation because there
is no connection between what caused the damage and the nor-
mal operation of the aircraft. However, there is also a body of
case law in which hijackings have been accepted by air carriers
as falling under the scope of the Convention. For example, in
cases such as Husserl v. Swissair328 and Haddad c. Air France,3 29
acts of hijacking were accepted by the respective courts as falling
under the Convention. Moreover, even Justice O'Connor in Saks
noted that courts have regarded terrorist attacks and hijackings
as coming under Article 17.330 Where Georgette Miller observes
324 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 322, art. 17(1).
325 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
326 Id. at 405.
327 Elmar Maria Giemulla & Ronald Schmid, WARSAW CONVENT-ION 2 (1992).
328 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
3- Haddad c. Air France 1979 RFDA 329 (TGI Paris, Apr. 28, 1978).
330 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405 (referring to Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) and Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F.
Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975)).
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that the carrier "can exonerate himself if he establishes that all
the required security measures had been taken." '331
It is most likely that Malaysia Airlines, as a responsible carrier,
will not dispute passenger claims made under the Montreal
Convention up to its liability limit. However, because the liability
cap is set at 113,100 Special Drawing Rights, 3 2 legal counsel for
passengers may seek a higher level of compensation than the
liability limit in the first tier of liability. If they do, then the car-
rier will have to make a decision as to whether to defend and
argue for the imposition of the liability limit. It could do this by
seeking to establish, under Article 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Mon-
treal Convention, that it was not negligent in causing the dam-
age, or that the damage resulted solely from the negligence or
other wrongful act or omission of a third party.33
As Malaysian Airlines has acted promptly to provide the
United States with $50,000 in advance payments, 3 4 it seems
most likely that they will not defend actions up to the liability
cap, at the very least. It is arguably likely that they will seek to
create a negotiated settlement with passengers up to a certain
level of compensation (somewhere above the first tier cap but
short of multi-million dollar amounts).
One principle that may come into play is the principle of ex-
clusivity. The Montreal Convention represents the sole and ex-
clusive remedy for passengers against the air carrier.3 5 This
means that if there is no "accident" under Article 17 of the Con-
vention, 6 there is no other remedy available for the passenger
against the air carrier. To some extent this may act as a break
upon outlandish claims. The other factor that may enter the ne-
gotiation matrix is the fact that Eurocontrol cleared the flight
path; hence the negligence of the air carrier in this case is by no
means a given proposition.
331 GEORGET=E MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 111 (1977).
332 See Montreal Convention of 1999 Working Paper, supra note 219 (an SDR
of 113,110 is approximately U.S. $170,000 as of April 2013).
333 See Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 322, art. 21(1)(a),(b).
334 Daisy Melwani, Malaysian Airlines Fights Back Against 'Insulting' Offer Claim,
TRAVEL WEEKLY (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.travelweekly.com.au/news/malaysia-
airlines-fights-back-against-insulting-of [http://perma.cc/8PP7-EYE8].
335 Montreal Convention of 1999, supra note 322.
336 Id. art. 17(1) ("The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused
the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.").
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Another potentially pressing matter for the dependents of the
passengers is the limitations period under the Convention,
which sits at two years. 3 7 Hence, if claims are not brought
within two years, the passenger loses the ability to bring a claim
against the air carrier. Article 35 of the Montreal Convention
provides that " [t] he right to damages shall be extinguished if an
action is not brought within a period of two years, reckoned
from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on
which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on
which the carriage stopped. 3 3 8 The case law suggests that the
courts strictly apply the limitations period, such that compliance
with the two-year limitations period under Article 35 is a "condi-
tion precedent" for bringing an action. 39 Where the most logi-
cal cause of action for relatives of Flight MH17 passengers lies
under the Montreal Convention, and against the air carrier, it is
imperative that their legal advisers keep their eyes on the clock,
which is most definitely running.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. THE WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the authors conclude
that there are sufficient grounds to conduct a criminal war
crimes investigation. This investigation should be in the nature
of a criminal investigation rather than a mere civil enquiry,
though it certainly would work in tandem with any investigation
carried out by the Dutch and international authorities. A crimi-
nal investigation would place greater focus on the participation
of the actors, as well as the surrounding circumstances concern-
ing, inter alia, specific orders given, quantum of authority exer-
cised, training of relevant troops, role of specific actors, issuance
of written and oral orders by and to the relevant actors, and
existing policy rules of engagement in the conflict.
The initiation of a criminal investigation is justified on the
basis that there is sufficient evidence or probable cause to be-
lieve that some potential suspects, especially Strelkov, exercised
337 Id. art. 35.
338 Id.
339 See, e.g., Narayanan v. British Airways, CV 11-2175-JFW CWX, 2011 WL
10004677 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011); Dickson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d
623, 627 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (observing that "the bringing of the action within two
years was, by the express language of the Convention, a condition precedent");
Hall v. Heart of England Balloons Ltd., Case No. 8BM10813 (Birmingham Cty.
Ct., Nov. 17, 2009); Lemieux v. Halifax Int'l Airport Authority, 2011 NSSC 396.
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effective control over the relevant troops, that the acts do in fact
constitute war crimes, and that there was subordinate miscon-
duct and/or command responsibility. Moreover, the prelimi-
nary findings establish probable cause that the relevant actors
satisfy the relatively low negligence mens rea requirements for
command responsibility, as the missiles were allegedly fired
without the necessary fail-safe safety mechanisms (essentially be-
ing fired blind into unrestricted airspace where significant com-
mercial air traffic flew). Preliminary findings may also suggest
that there was a "shoot first policy" bolstering the mens rea re-
quirements for subordinate liability. Additionally, the evidence
needed to establish superior liability on the part of Russian au-
thorities appears anecdotal, and in the absence of sufficient evi-
dence (but subject to developing investigation), an investigation
would probably proceed under the assumption that this is an
NIAC.
The practicalities of conducting a criminal investigation may
be daunting because it would take place in a war zone, but this is
not particularly unusual in war crime investigations common to
international tribunals. 4 ° Theoretically, the arrest, investiga-
tion, and trial could vest under a variety of jurisdictional bases
including domestic Ukrainian, or could stem horizontally from
victim states under theories of nationality jurisdiction, or even, if
Ukraine opted, for an ad hoc non-party state self-referral to the
ICC based on Article 12(3)."' This latter method may be the
most likely means to bring this issue before an international tri-
bunal, as the Ukraine has already availed itself of this mecha-
nism by referring alleged crimes committed during the civil
unrest preceding the departure of the former President of
Ukraine . 4 2 The prior self-referral was temporally limited to the
340 Investigations have taken place in war zones including in the former Yugo-
slavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and others.
34, RS, supra note 77, art. 12(3) ("If the acceptance of a State which is not a
party to this statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration
lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with
respect to the crime in question.").
342 The Ukrainian Parliament Rada officially filed a 12(3) declaration to the
ICC passed on February 25, 2014 and lodged with the Court on April 9, 2014 for
crimes against humanity and directed at ousted Ukrainian leader Yanukovych
Viktor Fedorovuch, along with Pshonka Viktor Pavlovych (ex-Prosecutor General
of Ukraine), Zakharchenko Vitalii Yuriiovych (ex-Minister of Internal Affairs of
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period from November 21, 2013 to February 22, 2014,14' ending
approximately five months before the downing of Flight MH17.
Though this referral is the subject of some controversy, 44 partic-
ularly since a 2001 Ukrainian Constitutional Court case suggests
the illegality of such a referral, 45 it may, if extended or repli-
cated, nonetheless provide the best opportunity for a full crimi-
nal investigation and potential criminal liability of the
perpetrators. Indeed, as the need for a thorough and objective
criminal investigation is paramount to a resolution, the authors
argue that Ukraine should enlarge. its 12(3) declaration to in-
clude war crimes and cover the time period during which the
Flight MH17 was downed.
B. AVIATION ISSUES
In the past, both China and the United States have made pay-
ments to the relatives of deceased passengers where civil aircraft
have been shot down. With the U.S.S. Vincennes/Iran Air inci-
dent, this was done even without conceding legal liability. If Rus-
sian citizens were involved in launching a missile that downed
Flight MH17, there is a case for Russia making payments to fami-
lies of passengers. Despite the political winds that blow around
this incident, the making of such payments would serve to en-
hance claims of Russian responsibility within the international
community. This step would represent an appropriate, face-sav-
ing initiative. While Russia's Cold War history in this respect was
deplorable, President Putin has the opportunity to delineate his
administration from the heavy handedness of the past.
Another compensation option is if the air carrier, in consulta-
tion with its insurers, elects to waive its defenses to the liability
cap. Alternatively, it may simply seek to make settlement offers
in excess of the liability limit of 113,100 SDR. This would re-
present a mature response to the complex maze of responsibility
and liability created by this extraordinary event.
Although the Convention on Compensation for Damage to
Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference In-
volving Aircraft focuses on compensation for damage to third
343 Id.
4 See Kevin Jon Heller, Thoughts on the Ukraine Ad Hoc Self-Referra, OPINIO
Julus (Apr. 18, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/18/thoughts-ukraine-ad-
hoc-self-referral/ [http://perma.cc/HNP9-5PEJ] (providing an interesting dis-
cussion on this issue).
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parties, not passengers, Article 8 is worthy of examination. 4 6
Chapter III, Article 8 of this Convention provides for the estab-
lishment of an International Civil Aviation Compensation
Fund.347 Although this convention is not yet in force, in the
tragic circumstances of Flight MH17, States may be moved to
consider the desirability of creating a standalone fund for vic-
tims, including passengers, if issues of attribution cannot be de-
finitively established. However, with only thirteen signatures,
two ratifications, and five accessions, the support for this partic-
ular Convention and its approach in all contexts may seem
somewhat limited.348
C. AIRSPACE CLOSURE
The key regulators, such as ICAO and Eurocontrol, were
quick to emphasize that ultimate responsibility for airspace clo-
sure lies with individual States, essentially as a product of their
sovereignty over air space. At the same time the ICAO letters to
States, before and after the Flight MH17 incident, suggest its
important leadership role. Equally, Eurocontrol's "single Euro-
pean sky" concept and its activation of the EACCC suggest that
its leadership role goes well beyond the mere formulation of
aims and objectives.
After the event, the peak industry body, IATA, appropriately
called for the establishment of "fail-safe channels for essential
threat information to be made available 3 49 to both State civil
aviation authorities and the industry, namely the airlines. The
report of the recent Second-High-Level Safety Conference
(2015) emphasizes the need'to enhance "existing mechanisms."
If this means modification of the standards contained in An-
nexes 11 and 17 of the Chicago Convention, and the two secur-
ity manuals,3 5 0 so as to provide the fail-safe notifications asked
for by IATA, such steps would be positive.
346 Convention on Compensation for Damages to Third Parties Resulting from
Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft art. 8, May 2, 2009, ICAO Doc.
9920.
347 Id. art. 8.
348 See Status List, ICAO, Convention on Compensation For Damage Caused by
Aircraft to Third Parties Done at Montreal on 2 May 2009, http://www.icao.int/
secretariat/legal/List% 20of% 20Parties/2009-GRCEN.pdf [http://perma.cc/
6D55-ARS9] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
349 Joint Statement on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones, supra
note 243.
350 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Manual Concerning Safety Measures Re-
lating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations,
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However, there is a need for a global response that goes be-
yond "existing mechanisms." In the view of the authors, a proac-
tive approach is required to provide air carriers and passengers
with the safety that they require. Arguably, there is a need for a
single body to be vested with the role of notifying States and
airlines of the need to adjust routes to avoid zones involving
ground based insurgency or warfare, as well as to declare pro-
hibited areas of airspace to a much greater height than previ-
ously considered necessary. In the authors' view, the key
regulators need to decisively address this issue rather than seek
to refine a system that has failed. To borrow the words of IATA,
only a "fail-safe" system will suffice.
ICAO Doc. 9554-AN/932 (1st ed. 1990), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/anconf
12/Document%20Archive/9554_consen.pdf; Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO],
Aviation Security Manual, ICAO Doc. 8973-Restricted.
